Shin Bet Chief Warned Netanyahu of Hamas Attack Days Before Oct. 7
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of an imminent, extreme Hamas threat and recommended assassinations a week before the October 7th attack, but Netanyahu did not approve the action. The article also suggests warnings from the UAE president were not fully shared with other security chiefs.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Shin Bet chief warned Netanyahu of extreme Hamas threat before Oct. 7.
- Netanyahu rejected Shin Bet's call to assassinate top Hamas leaders.
- UAE president also warned Netanyahu and CIA director of impending attack.
- Key security officials reportedly unaware of specific warnings to Netanyahu.
- Security officials doubt earlier alerts would have prevented the attack.
A week before the October 7th Hamas attack, Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar presented Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with a direct demand to assassinate top Hamas officials. Bar warned Netanyahu that Hamas was "preparing something extreme," even using the phrase "earthquake" to describe the impending threat, according to a security official.
Bar's recommendation included targeting Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and other senior figures. However, Netanyahu did not approve the proposed assassinations. The security official confirmed that the information presented to the Prime Minister was accurate and that the recommendation was made, but it was not acted upon.
Around the same time, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed advised Netanyahu to pursue an economic solution for Gaza and de-escalate tensions in the West Bank. Netanyahu reportedly responded calmly, suggesting Hamas's focus would be on the West Bank and assuring bin Zayed that Israel was prepared for any scenario. Bin Zayed also shared his concerns with then-CIA Director William Burns, warning that "something is about to explode."
Notably, the article claims that the warning bin Zayed conveyed to Netanyahu was not shared with other top security officials, including the heads of the Mossad and the IDF. They were reportedly unaware of the specific alert the Prime Minister had received.
Security officials also pushed back against the idea that an earlier alert to Netanyahu or the Defense Minister on the night of October 6-7 would have necessarily prevented the attack. They stated that the intelligence available at the time was incomplete and did not clearly indicate Hamas's offensive intentions, with some information suggesting a continuation of routine in Gaza. They argued that even if alerted, the time required for a high-level assessment and decision-making would have brought the discussion too close to the attack's commencement.
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