Election Scenarios: How Party Alignments Could Have Altered Knesset Balance
Translated & summarized from Arutz Sheva by baba
An Election Barometer analysis by Masar-Ravdim shows how different party formations could have altered the 26th Knesset's balance. If candidate Winter had withdrawn and Handel passed the threshold, the right-wing bloc's lead would have shrunk from 5 to 2 seats. A non-merger of Religious Zionism and Identity parties could have flipped the balance, giving the change bloc a 2-seat lead. The analysis suggests the current right-wing bloc advantage might be due to specific merger and candidacy decisions.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Candidate Winter's withdrawal could have narrowed the right-wing bloc's lead from 5 to 2 seats.
- If Religious Zionism and Identity ran separately, the change bloc could have gained a 2-seat advantage.
- Handel's ability to cross the electoral threshold was a key factor in several hypothetical scenarios.
- The analysis suggests current right-wing bloc gains may stem from specific party mergers.
- Minor shifts in party alignments can dramatically impact government formation and Israel's future.
A new analysis by the Masar-Ravdim Institute, as part of its Election Barometer, reveals how different party formations and candidate withdrawals could have significantly altered the balance of power in the 26th Knesset. The calculations are based on the actual election results, where the right-wing bloc secured 53 seats compared to the change bloc's 48.
One surprising scenario suggests that if candidate Winter had withdrawn, the current 5-seat deficit for the change bloc could have narrowed to just 2 seats. This outcome, however, hinges on whether Handel would have crossed the electoral threshold. If approximately 31.5% of Winter's votes had gone to Handel, enabling him to pass the threshold, the right-wing advantage would have been reduced to 50 seats versus 52 for the change bloc. In this specific case, Winter's independent run actually widened the gap in favor of the right.
Conversely, if Handel had failed to cross the threshold even after Winter's withdrawal, the gap would have widened to 6 seats for the right-wing bloc. Further complicating matters, if the Noam party had also withdrawn and its votes split evenly between the Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties, the Likud party would have gained an additional seat at the expense of Yesh Atid, expanding the gap to 8 seats.
Another significant hypothetical involves the potential non-merger of the Religious Zionism and Identity parties. Had they run separately, it's highly probable both would have fallen below the electoral threshold, as Identity's support was around 2.5% before the union. This would have flipped the bloc balance, giving the change bloc a 2-seat advantage (51 seats to 49). Such a result would have provided the change bloc with greater public legitimacy to form a minority government, potentially with the abstention of Arab parties.
If Handel had also managed to pass the threshold in this non-merger scenario, the opposition's advantage would have expanded to 5 seats (53 seats for the opposition versus 48 for the government), effectively reversing the current bloc balance. The analysis concludes that the joint run of Smotrich and Feiglin, combined with Winter's separate candidacy, may have yielded the best outcome for the right-wing bloc, highlighting the dramatic impact of even minor shifts in vote distribution and party alignments on government formation and Israel's future.
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