New Intel Before Oct. 7: Deif Seen Entering Tunnel, Anti-Tank Unit Activity
Translated & summarized from Mako by baba
Two new intelligence indicators, including the identification of Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif entering a tunnel and changes in anti-tank unit activity, were cleared for publication regarding the lead-up to the October 7 attack. Despite these signs and the activation of Israeli SIM cards, "cooling" indicators led to an underestimation of Hamas's intentions, with the security establishment believing it was a drill or limited conflict. Former Military Secretary Avi Gill detailed how these signs were presented, alongside contradictory information, before the attack commenced.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- New intelligence indicated Mohammed Deif entering a tunnel and changes in Hamas's anti-tank unit activity before Oct. 7.
- Previously known indicators included hundreds of Israeli SIM cards activated in Gaza.
- Conflicting "cooling" signs led to an underestimation of Hamas's attack intentions.
- Hamas had previously canceled a planned attack for Passover eve due to Israeli alert.
- Former Military Secretary Avi Gill described the intelligence presented on the morning of the attack.
Two additional intelligence indicators suggesting Hamas might launch an attack on October 7 were cleared for publication by military censorship. The intelligence gathered by the security establishment on the eve of the massacre included the identification of Mohammed Deif, head of Hamas's military wing, descending into a tunnel. Concurrently, intelligence sources detected changes in the activity of the organization's anti-tank missile (ATGM) array in the Gaza Strip.
These indicators emerged alongside other previously published signs, such as the activation of hundreds of Israeli SIM cards within the Gaza Strip. Despite the accumulation of data, several "cooling" signs were also observed, leading the security establishment to underestimate Hamas's intentions at the time. The assessment was that these activities were either a Hamas drill or preparations for a limited border conflict.
In September 2023, Hamas had designated the attack for the Passover Seder eve preceding Simchat Torah, but the IDF identified early signs and raised its alert level, leading Hamas to cancel the planned assault. It is possible the terror organization detected the Israeli shift in readiness and consequently aborted the attack.
Avi Gill, the Military Secretary to the Prime Minister at the time, recently described the events of that morning. The chief of staff to then-Shin Bet head Ronen Bar woke him at 6:12 AM, reporting suspicious signs overnight, including SIM card activity, senior officials going underground, and other indicators. However, Gill noted that alongside these, there were also "cooling" or contradictory signs, such as Hamas having conducted similar actions during past drills and training exercises. He emphasized two crucial factors: the belief in Hamas's routine patterns and, more importantly, the lack of immediate perceived sensitivity to timing.
Gill further stated that Bar instructed a "Tequila team" to be sent south as a precaution. Before briefing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Gill spoke with the military. He contacted the chief of staff to the IDF Chief of Staff at 6:22 AM. While they were speaking, the firing began a few minutes later, and Gill's phone began vibrating with numerous alerts about launches in the south.
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