IDF Saw Hamas Leaders Enter Tunnels Before Oct. 7 Massacre, Report Says
Translated & summarized from Cursorinfo by baba
The IDF detected Hamas leaders, including Mohammed Deif, entering tunnels before the October 7 attack, one of five alarming signals that were largely ignored by political leadership. These signals, including militant activity near rocket launchers and repositioned missiles, were not individually deemed critical enough to predict a full-scale war. Investigations into the intelligence failure revealed that some anomalies had alternative explanations or were dismissed, while others were not fully assessed.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- IDF saw Hamas leaders, including Mohammed Deif, enter tunnels before the October 7 attack.
- This was one of at least five alarming signals identified by the IDF prior to the massacre.
- Hamas had spent years misleading Israel about its intentions for a large-scale attack.
- Some detected anomalies had alternative explanations or were not considered serious threats.
- Intelligence officers did not consider an attack to be imminent despite unusual activity.
The Israeli military (IDF) detected Hamas leaders, including the commander of the group's military wing Mohammed Deif, descending into underground tunnels on the eve of the October 7 massacre, according to a report by The Times of Israel. This movement into tunnels on the night of October 6-7, 2023, was one of at least five alarming signals the IDF identified prior to the attack, indicating unusual activity in the Gaza Strip. Most of these signals had remained classified until now, as Israeli security services recently permitted the disclosure of further preparatory signs.
Previously, only the activation of dozens of SIM cards used by Hamas's elite 'Nukhba' unit was publicly known. The newly revealed indicators include Deif's descent, preparatory actions by militants near rocket launchers, and changes in the positioning of Hamas anti-tank missile systems. An investigation into the reasons for the defense failure revealed that some of these detected anomalies had alternative explanations or were not considered sufficiently serious indicators of an impending attack.
Simultaneously, there were also signals suggesting Hamas militants were operating as usual. While no single sign was deemed significant enough by military officials to predict an imminent attack, especially since some had been observed before, their combined nature was unusual. Intelligence officers conducted numerous checks on the night before the attack to confirm or deny preparations for an assault on Israel.
These checks alleviated some suspicions, but other signals remained unevaluated. No officer considered an attack to be imminent. The full intelligence picture might have prompted the command to increase readiness for a targeted Hamas attack, but not for a large-scale war. The report also notes that Hamas had spent years deliberately misleading Israel into believing the group did not plan a major assault.
