Missed Signs: Hamas Chief Deif Went to Bunker, IDF Thought It Was Drill
Translated & summarized from Behadrei Haredim by baba
New details show Israel's security forces misinterpreted signs of Hamas's impending attack on October 7th, including Mohammed Deif's move to a bunker. These indicators, such as missile system tests and launch pit preparations, were initially deemed routine or a drill. The IDF Chief of Staff ordered a review of the information with a severe perspective to understand Hamas's intentions.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Hamas leader Mohammed Deif's move to a bunker was misinterpreted by the IDF as a drill before October 7th.
- Intelligence detected Hamas missile system tests and preparation of rocket launch pits prior to the attack.
- Senior Hamas figures, including Deif, descended into underground bunkers on the night of October 6th-7th.
- The IDF initially interpreted these unusual activities as routine or part of a drill.
- Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi ordered a severe review of the intelligence to understand Hamas's intentions.
New details reveal a series of missed signals and misinterpretations by Israel's security establishment in the hours before the October 7th Hamas attacks. Intelligence had detected unusual activity within Hamas, including tests of anti-tank missile systems, the preparation of rocket launch pits, and the descent of senior Hamas figures, notably Mohammed Deif, into underground bunkers.
Despite the anomalies, these signs were initially interpreted by the IDF as routine or a drill. Around 11:30 PM on October 6th, initial indications of unusual activity by Hamas leaders were received but were dismissed with a "calming" explanation. Shortly before midnight, the Southern Command's intelligence officer informed the commanding general that Deif might be heading to an underground emergency facility.
During that conversation, several possibilities were considered, including fear of an IDF operation, a drill, or a surprise local offensive. At 1:46 AM on October 7th, the Chief of Staff's office was first alerted to the developments by the head of the Shin Bet's office, who requested special collection assets be focused on Deif.
Less than an hour later, at 2:30 AM, further alarming intelligence emerged about the preparation of launch pits in a specific area of Gaza. This prompted urgent update calls to senior officers, including the Southern Command general and the head of the Operations Directorate. The Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, convened a special late-night situation assessment following this new information, combined with intelligence about Hamas operatives activating Israeli SIM cards.
Concluding the assessment, Halevi stated, "Although there is no logic in a proactive offensive operation, the information must be examined with a severe perspective to fully understand Hamas's intentions and what could surprise us."
