Strategic Voting: How to Form a Government Beyond Party Size
Translated & summarized from Zman Yisrael by baba
The article argues that Israeli government formation depends on Knesset majority recommendations, not just party size, citing the 2009 precedent where Benjamin Netanyahu formed a government despite Tzipi Livni's party being larger. It advises voters to consider coalition potential and candidate reliability when choosing, urging strategic voting to achieve a majority for change rather than solely boosting the leading party. The ultimate goal is a stable coalition, not necessarily empowering the largest single faction.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Government formation in Israel depends on Knesset majority recommendations, not just party size.
- The 2009 election saw Benjamin Netanyahu tasked with forming a government over Tzipi Livni's larger party.
- A deadlock scenario could allow the president to task another MK with forming a government.
- Voters should consider coalition potential and candidate reliability for a stable majority.
- Strategic voting aims for a Knesset majority for change, not just strengthening the leading party.
The article discusses the complexities of government formation in Israel, emphasizing that the size of a party is not the sole determinant of who receives the mandate to form a government. It presents hypothetical scenarios, such as the Joint List or Degel HaTorah becoming the largest faction, to illustrate that the president's decision is influenced by the number of Knesset members who recommend a candidate. The author highlights the 2009 election precedent, where Tzipi Livni's Kadima, despite being the largest party, did not receive the mandate because 65 MKs recommended Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud. The president ultimately tasked Netanyahu with forming a government, believing he had a better chance of success.
The piece also addresses the potential for a deadlock, where two leading candidates might each secure 60 recommendations. In such a situation, the law allows the president to task another MK with forming a government, and the author suggests that intense persuasion and incentives could sway MKs to change their allegiances. Voters are urged to consider the experience and reliability of candidates, particularly within the "change bloc," and to think critically about how their vote contributes to forming a stable majority coalition rather than just strengthening a specific party leader.
The author advocates for strategic voting, suggesting that voters who wish to replace the current government should prioritize forming a Knesset majority over bolstering the leading party in the "change bloc." For instance, those who support Avigdor Lieberman's agenda or wish to emulate the achievements of the previous Naftali Bennett-Yair Lapid government should vote accordingly, even if it means not necessarily voting for the leading candidate in the "change bloc." The core question, the article concludes, is not the size of a single party but the composition of factions that can collectively form a parliamentary majority.
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