Ex-Shin Bet Chief Bar's Lawsuit Exposes Netanyahu's Failures

A lawsuit filed by former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, ostensibly for NIS 3 million, is in reality a detailed statement for a potential future inquiry into the October 7th failures. Bar expresses frustration over Netanyahu's obstruction of any investigation, using the legal platform to document numerous warnings and alerts he provided to Netanyahu in the months preceding the Hamas surprise attack. He leverages recent accusations by the Prime Minister to present his own account.

Bar's lawsuit reveals a deeply dysfunctional and toxic relationship between himself and Netanyahu. According to the filing, the Prime Minister consistently disregarded and disrespectfully dismissed Bar's assessments. Despite repeated rejections and what Bar perceived as Netanyahu's hostile attitude, Bar persistently advocated for proactive measures against Hamas in Gaza. He recommended an operation to eliminate Hamas leader Sinwar as early as their first meeting in November 2022, and again six months later, citing intelligence about Sinwar's "messianic tendencies." Bar claims Netanyahu refused, fearing retaliation against himself.

Bar argues that Netanyahu's policy of containment, rather than initiating offensive actions, eroded Israel's deterrence. He describes how Sinwar grew bolder, understanding that Israel, and specifically Netanyahu, feared disrupting the quiet in Gaza. Bar asserts that Israel became deterred by Hamas, not the other way around.

The article points out two significant weaknesses in Bar's defense. Firstly, his recommendations consistently focused on offensive actions, which Netanyahu rejected, stating the Shin Bet is not responsible for national strategy. The article suggests that eliminating Sinwar could have had severe strategic consequences. Bar's persistent, albeit futile, push for offensive measures is described as "hitting a wall." Simultaneously, Bar failed to adequately strengthen the Shin Bet's intelligence gathering in Gaza, particularly human intelligence, focusing instead on operations. This, while operations were delayed and intelligence faltered, allowed Sinwar's "grand project" to develop unnoticed.

Secondly, the article questions Bar's actions on the night of October 7th. Given his alleged concerns about Hamas's buildup, Sinwar's mindset, eroded Israeli deterrence, and problematic intelligence, the article asks why he didn't raise a stronger alarm, especially with unusual data about Hamas operatives' SIM card usage. Bar himself admits the Shin Bet's alert at 3:03 AM was less severe than it should have been and that the agency failed to grasp the full scope of Hamas's plot. The entire affair underscores the need for a thorough investigation to address the Shin Bet's role in national security strategy, its relationship with the Prime Minister, and its intelligence failures.