Ex-Shin Bet Chief Sues Netanyahu for $820,000 Over Oct. 7 Blame

Former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar is suing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for NIS 3 million (approximately $820,000) in damages, alleging defamation. Bar claims Netanyahu falsely attributed "failures and crimes" related to the October 7th Hamas attack to him, calling it a "blood libel."

Bar acknowledges Shin Bet's failures but asserts Netanyahu is attempting to shift his own shortcomings onto others to evade responsibility for his "chain of failures." The lawsuit was filed in the Central District Court. A key legal hurdle will be convincing the court that Netanyahu does not have parliamentary immunity for his actions in his role as prime minister. Bar's legal team will likely argue that Netanyahu's statements were intended to shield himself from personal accountability for October 7th. The court's decision on immunity will precede any other proceedings; if immunity is granted, the lawsuit will be dismissed.

Bar's filing states that Netanyahu, who complained about not being woken on the morning of October 7th, was "asleep for months prior" and refused to heed repeated warnings. It argues that Netanyahu's attempt to narrowly focus the discussion on the hours before the attack is a manipulative tactic to obscure the fact that its roots lie in events months earlier.

According to Bar, Netanyahu, responsible for national security doctrine and directives, pursued a "quiet at all costs" policy in Gaza for years. This policy involved explicit instructions to maintain quiet, postpone confrontations, keep Gaza a secondary arena, and preserve Hamas as the governing entity. Bar, who opposed this policy, repeatedly recommended offensive actions to curb Hamas's buildup and restore deterrence, but Netanyahu did not advance these recommendations.

One manifestation of this policy, Bar claims, was Netanyahu's approval of Qatari money entering Gaza. Despite Shin Bet's opposition and numerous warnings, Netanyahu allowed these funds to be transferred, knowing they were used to strengthen Hamas's military wing and rule, while also enhancing Qatar's influence, contrary to Shin Bet's warnings about allowing a state openly supporting Hamas into the arena.

Bar contends that Netanyahu's "quiet directive" and the restriction of security agencies' operational freedom in Gaza stripped them of a key counter-terrorism tool: attacking command centers, leaders, and terror instigators. This policy, Bar argues, enabled Hamas's massive buildup into a "terror army" on Israel's border, effectively immune from decisive action. Netanyahu, he claims, took a heavy security gamble, leaving Israeli civilians exposed to a surprise attack in the absence of precise, timely intelligence.

Bar insists this is not hindsight, citing the significant gap between his hawkish stance and Netanyahu's accommodating one, evident early on. Bar's strategic vision for the Shin Bet, shared with Netanyahu, explicitly stated Israel could not accept an Islamist fundamentalist enemy with military capabilities on its border. Netanyahu's policy, proven wrong, left Israel dependent on intelligence that could not be guaranteed and the border fence's mercy.

Bar repeatedly warned Netanyahu about the dangers of his policy, Hamas's buildup, the erosion of deterrence, and the risk of a multi-front war, presenting action plans. Just two months before October 7th, Bar explicitly warned Netanyahu, "I am giving you a strategic warning of war," adding, "we will not know the day or the hour."