Israel Dismantles Hamas Infrastructure, Weakening Terror Group's Capabilities

Three years after the October 7th attacks, Hamas aims to regain control of Gaza territories upon an eventual Israeli withdrawal. The terror organization is reportedly trying to preserve its battalions in Rafah and northern Gaza for future operations, and has hidden rocket components and weapons east of the 'red line' for later use. However, Israel has been systematically dismantling Gaza's infrastructure over the past year, completing most of the above-ground destruction of buildings containing terror infrastructure or weapon caches. This process also targeted underground structures, some booby-trapped or used as militant hideouts.

The second phase, focused on underground infrastructure, is ongoing. Security forces are using specialized equipment to locate and destroy tunnels through controlled explosions or by filling them with concrete. This effort has yielded results, including the elimination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Rafah due to tunnel destruction. The IDF is also locating and destroying the rocket components Hamas had buried.

Israel currently controls 63% of Gaza, encompassing areas where Hamas brigades operated, including Rafah, northern Gaza, eastern Gaza City, and eastern Khan Younis. This fragmentation forces Hamas units to relocate, weakening their defensive capabilities and making them vulnerable. Hamas, however, is maintaining these units as reserves, anticipating a future Israeli withdrawal.

Despite Israeli government claims of Hamas planning attacks ahead of elections, sources indicate significant resource limitations for the terror group. Hamas is estimated to possess only a few hundred rockets, a drastic reduction from thousands before the war, significantly limiting its ability to launch large-scale attacks. There is also a shortage of weaponry, with some items unobtainable and others of poor quality. While Hamas recruits young individuals, their training is basic, with some combatant training lasting only a week, a stark contrast to the extensive training before October 7th. This decline in training impacts the military wing's capabilities.

Israel fears that targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders may not be enough to fully dismantle the organization, requiring a broader offensive in the Strip's depths. Nevertheless, these assassinations are believed to be eroding Hamas's deterrence and control over Gaza through its police forces. The article notes a decline in governance, citing incidents like militia raids and the capture of Hamas internal security chief Mu'een al-A'rabid. While Hamas replaces its fallen leaders, internal succession struggles are anticipated. The constant pursuit of its leadership also hinders Hamas's ability to organize significant attacks.

Hamas continues to embed itself within civilian infrastructure like schools, mosques, and hospitals, relying on them for protection. The organization's core strength lies not just in its military wing but also in its civilian network, including charitable societies and religious institutions. The leadership of this network, the Political Bureau in Gaza, has suffered significant losses, with new appointees considered weaker. The article concludes that without complete disarmament, any alternative governing body will struggle to take control, and other terror groups like Islamic Jihad, which still possesses thousands of fighters, are also attempting to rebuild.