Netanyahu Warned of War Months Before Oct. 7 Attack, Report Claims
Translated & summarized from Srugim by baba
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received multiple strategic warnings about the erosion of Israel's deterrence and the potential for war in the months leading up to the October 7th Hamas attack. Despite letters from military intelligence and security chiefs like Herzi Halevi and Ronen Bar, requests for urgent meetings were reportedly denied. The warnings highlighted that Israel's internal political crisis was being exploited by enemies. Netanyahu's office stated he received no prior warning of the attack, asserting security officials had claimed Hamas was deterred.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was warned multiple times about the erosion of Israel's deterrence and potential for war before October 7.
- Letters from military intelligence and security chiefs detailed concerns about enemies exploiting Israel's internal crisis.
- Requests for urgent meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu by top security officials were reportedly denied.
- Then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant sent a seven-page letter warning of escalation a month before the attack.
- Netanyahu's office claims he received no prior warning of a Hamas attack from Gaza.
- The report noted the responsibility for operational readiness lay with security officials who failed to prevent the attack.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was repeatedly warned in the months preceding the October 7th Hamas attack about the erosion of Israel's deterrence and the potential for war, according to a Channel 12 investigation. The report cited a series of letters, warnings, and testimonies detailing conversations that took place before the massacre.
In March 2023, Amit Saar, then head of the Research Division of Aman (military intelligence), sent Netanyahu a letter warning that Israel's enemies might exploit its internal political crisis. Following this, Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar requested an urgent meeting with Netanyahu, but their request was reportedly denied. Halevi later sent Netanyahu a document titled "Overall Situation Assessment, Between Red and Blue," in which he reiterated that the internal crisis was a central factor in Israel's enemies' assessments and that deterrence was being eroded.
Further warnings were issued in July. Saar wrote to Netanyahu on July 16th that the political-social crisis was encouraging Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas to "take risks against Israel." On July 23rd, Halevi sent another letter warning of the damage to deterrence. According to Channel 12, Netanyahu responded angrily, telling them to "talk to those in Kaplan" (referring to anti-government protesters). Around the same time, Bar called Netanyahu on the red phone, issuing a "strategic warning of war" and stating that Israel could lose control over events on all fronts.
Requests by Bar and Halevi for meetings with Netanyahu were reportedly rejected again the day before the vote on canceling the reasonableness clause. After the legislation passed, Halevi met with Netanyahu and stated, "You voted, you decided. I think we are in a danger zone." Warnings continued in August and September, with Bar stating on August 9th that Israel was "on the brink of the perfect storm" and experiencing an "deterrence deficit." On September 7th, a month before the attack, then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant sent Netanyahu a seven-page letter, echoing the assessment that the internal crisis was deepening the erosion of Israel's image among its enemies and increasing the chance of escalation.
The report emphasized that these were strategic warnings about war and escalation, not specific intelligence about a Hamas plan. It also noted that the responsibility for translating these warnings into operational readiness lay with senior security officials, who failed to prevent the surprise attack. A statement from the Prime Minister's office asserted that Netanyahu received no prior warning of a Hamas attack from Gaza, claiming instead that security officials repeatedly stated Hamas was deterred and favored settlement, advocating for humanitarian concessions to maintain quiet.
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