Netanyahu Was Warned of War Before Oct. 7, Documents Reveal
Translated & summarized from Mako by baba
Newly revealed documents show Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received multiple warnings from top security officials, including former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, in the months before October 7th. These warnings highlighted the erosion of deterrence and the risk of enemies exploiting internal divisions. Despite these alerts, requests for meetings were reportedly postponed, and Netanyahu's response to one warning was "It's not us! Talk to those in Kaplan." His office maintains he received no prior warning of the Hamas attack, while security officials allegedly reported Hamas was deterred.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Prime Minister Netanyahu received multiple warnings from top security officials before October 7th about deteriorating deterrence.
- Letters from former IDF Chief Herzi Halevi and ex-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned of enemies exploiting Israel's internal divisions.
- Requests for meetings with Netanyahu by security chiefs were reportedly postponed or rejected in the months leading up to the attack.
- A draft statement by Netanyahu's spokesperson proposing a freeze on judicial legislation was not released.
- Netanyahu's office claims he received no prior warning of the Hamas attack from Gaza.
- Former Defense Minister Gallant sent a seven-page letter on September 7th detailing the escalating risks.
Newly revealed documents and testimonies indicate that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received multiple warnings from top security officials in the months leading up to the October 7th Hamas attack, expressing concerns about deteriorating deterrence and the exploitation of internal Israeli divisions by enemies. These warnings, including letters from former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, highlighted the growing risk of war and the perception among adversaries that Israel was weakening.
Despite these alerts, the article details instances where requests for meetings with Netanyahu were reportedly postponed or rejected. One document from March, authored by the head of the IDF Intelligence Research Division, Amit Saar, warned that "enemies are deliberating whether to wait for Israel to weaken or act against it." Another letter from Halevi on March 21st cautioned that deterrence was eroding and enemies were identifying opportunities for offensive actions, but a requested discussion on the matter did not occur.
Following public statements by Gallant in late March about the internal rift affecting the IDF, Netanyahu announced his dismissal, which led to widespread protests. During this period, a draft statement was prepared by Netanyahu's spokesperson, Topaz Lok, proposing a freeze on legislative moves and Gallant's tenure, along with initiating dialogue, but Netanyahu ultimately decided not to release it.
Further warnings continued through July and August. In July, Saar reiterated concerns that the political crisis was encouraging Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas to act against Israel. Halevi and Gallant met with Netanyahu to urge him to stop, and Halevi sent another warning letter on July 23rd. Netanyahu's reported response to this was, "It's not us! Talk to those in Kaplan," referring to anti-government protesters. The head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, also reportedly issued a strategic warning of impending war via the red phone.
In August, Knesset Member Gadi Eisenkot sent a letter to Netanyahu detailing a significant decline in IDF readiness and cohesion due to the controversial judicial overhaul legislation, requesting an 18-month freeze on the legislation. On September 7th, exactly one month before the attack, Gallant sent a seven-page letter to Netanyahu, stating that the internal crisis was deepening Israel's negative image among its enemies, exacerbating the damage to deterrence, and increasing the likelihood of escalation.
Netanyahu's office stated that the Prime Minister received no prior warning of a Hamas attack from Gaza, asserting that security officials repeatedly claimed Hamas was deterred and seeking arrangements. The article concludes by noting that while these warnings may not have predicted a specific attack plan, they raise questions about the information presented to the Prime Minister and his subsequent actions, as well as the military's responsibility to translate strategic alerts into operational preparedness.
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