Journalist Slams Ex-IDF Chief Over October 7 Failures

Israeli journalist Geula Even-Saar has criticized former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi for his recent statements regarding the failures leading up to the October 7th Hamas attack. Even-Saar argued that Halevi should not only acknowledge the scale of the failure but also explain to the Israeli public why the military could not prevent the tragedy and who bears responsibility.

Even-Saar, writing for Maariv, noted that Halevi chose to make his remarks at a conference in New York, speaking in English, three years after the attack. She believes such explanations should be given first and foremost to the citizens whose security was entrusted to the military leadership.

The journalist also highlighted the case of Roni Eshel, an observer killed at the Nahal Oz military base. Her father, Eyal Eshel, stated that his daughter had repeatedly reported on Palestinian militant training near the border fence and warned of an impending large-scale attack, but these signals were ignored by the military. Eyal Eshel also claimed, based on his own investigation, that Iranian officers were present at the military facility on the morning of October 7th, though this information requires confirmation.

In his New York speech, Halevi admitted the attack was preventable, calling it a "preventable failure." However, Even-Saar contends this admission is insufficient. She insists on identifying who was responsible for intelligence analysis, why warnings did not lead to increased defense, and why the army was unprepared. Halevi had explained that prior to the attack, Israel's security priorities focused on Iran and Hezbollah, with Hamas being a lower concern, as they were believed to be interested in maintaining calm in Gaza. Halevi acknowledged Hamas deliberately fostered this perception, yet Even-Saar questions why the military maintained this assessment despite warnings.

Even-Saar also pointed out a contradiction in Halevi's statements about the Gaza ground operation. He suggested it took considerable effort to convince political leadership to launch the ground maneuver, implying a shift from air-strike-focused operations. This contrasts with Halevi's public statement on October 24, 2023, where he indicated that the IDF and Southern Command had prepared offensive plans and were ready for the next phase after political approval. Even-Saar questions why Halevi now speaks of prolonged efforts to persuade politicians if plans were already prepared and the army was ready.

Halevi also dismissed the possibility of betrayal within Israeli security forces, stating no one was found to have aided Hamas. While Even-Saar agrees that conspiracy theories are unacceptable, she stresses that the absence of betrayal evidence does not absolve leadership of responsibility. She argues that investigating the catastrophe requires examining flawed decisions, intelligence failures, misjudgments of threats, and the military's inability to react to warnings, rather than searching for traitors. Even-Saar concluded by calling for Halevi to answer these critical questions publicly in Israel, before the people most affected by the security system's failure.