Ex-IDF Chief Halevi Faces Scrutiny Over October 7th Accountability
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
Former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi is facing criticism for discussing the October 7th failures in English at a New York conference rather than in Israel. Author Gaula Even-Saar argues Halevi must provide direct accountability to the Israeli public for the "historic security and command lapse." Halevi described the events as a "preventable failure" and expressed personal pain, but Even-Saar questions his explanations regarding strategic priorities and the timing of the Gaza ground maneuver. The article also touches on claims of Iranian presence on Israeli soil and the distinction between betrayal and systemic failure.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Former IDF Chief Herzi Halevi is criticized for discussing October 7th failures in English at a New York conference.
- Author Gaula Even-Saar demands Halevi provide accountability in Hebrew to the Israeli public.
- Halevi called October 7th a "preventable failure," but Even-Saar labels it a "historic security and command lapse."
- Questions arise over Halevi's differing accounts of the Gaza ground maneuver's delay.
- Eyal Eshel reportedly claimed Iranian officers were present on Israeli soil on October 7th.
- Even-Saar distinguishes between lack of betrayal and responsibility for the catastrophic failure.
Former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi's recent remarks at a New York conference, delivered in English, have drawn criticism from author Gaula Even-Saar. Even-Saar argues that Halevi, who served as chief of staff during the October 7th attacks, should have addressed the failures and accountability in Israel, in Hebrew, before the public who paid the price. Halevi described the events of October 7th as a "preventable failure" and expressed personal anguish, citing the image of Shiri Bibas as a symbol of the IDF's inability to protect citizens in time. However, Even-Saar contends that this was not merely a failure but a historic security and command lapse, demanding deeper explanations from Halevi.
Even-Saar questions who was responsible for preventing the disaster, highlighting the roles of the IDF, military intelligence (AMAN), Southern Command, and Shin Bet. She criticizes Halevi's assertion that the military itself placed Hamas low on its threat assessment, questioning the value of any warnings given this perceived strategic misjudgment. The author also points to a discrepancy in Halevi's accounts regarding the ground maneuver in Gaza. While he stated in New York that it took a long time to convince the political echelon to initiate the maneuver, an October 2023 statement from the IDF suggested readiness and joint decision-making with the political level, raising questions about which version is accurate.
Adding another layer, Eyal Eshel, father of fallen soldiers, reportedly shared information about Persian-speaking Iranian officers being present at a base on the morning of October 7th, suggesting direct Iranian involvement on Israeli soil. Even-Saar notes Halevi's denial of any betrayal, stating that no individual was found to have aided Hamas. However, she emphasizes that the absence of betrayal does not absolve anyone of responsibility for the catastrophic failure, which she attributes to complacency, intelligence failures, and flawed decision-making.
Even-Saar concludes by stating that while Halevi's pain is understandable, the Israeli public needs direct answers in Hebrew about accountability, not insights delivered comfortably in English to a foreign audience. She urges Halevi to confront his own responsibility for the failures, not in New York, but in Israel, before the citizens he was tasked with protecting.
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