Pre-Oct 7 Intelligence Failures: Hamas Leader Deif's Bunker Activity Questioned

Military censor has cleared the release of further details regarding intelligence failures leading up to the October 7th Hamas attack, specifically focusing on the night between October 6th and 7th. The newly revealed information indicates that multiple unusual signs were observed by Israeli security forces throughout that night, but these were explained away with reassuring interpretations rather than being pieced together to form a cohesive picture of an imminent threat.

Among the five key indicators reported to Military Intelligence (Aman) and the Southern Command were the activation of dozens of SIM cards in Gaza, unusual movements in Hamas's rocket and anti-tank missile arrays, and suspicious activity around senior Hamas officials. Most notably, there was unusual activity near one of Mohammed Deif's bunkers, suggesting the activation of an "emergency asset", a pre-prepared tunnel. However, it was not definitively confirmed that Deif himself had entered the tunnel.

Information transfer issues were also highlighted. Around 9:30 PM, the Shin Bet sent a WhatsApp message to Aman about the SIM card activations, which was then forwarded to Southern Command. Despite similar activations occurring in previous weeks, the significance was downplayed. Later that night, indications of movement around senior Hamas figures and Deif's bunker were interpreted as fear of Israeli action, possibly due to recent discussions about targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders.

Further intelligence, including apparent tests of anti-tank missile systems and localized rocket array anomalies, were also dismissed as routine or minor. Despite these accumulating signs, significant alert level increases in the Gaza sector were not implemented. Some commanders returned to base, and while air defense readiness was bolstered, some battalion commanders on weekend leave were not recalled.

The article also points to a significant intelligence gathering failure by Unit 8200, with insufficient monitoring of lower-level operatives and communication devices. This lack of comprehensive surveillance meant that the scale of Hamas's preparations, even as thousands of operatives and communication devices became active, could not be accurately assessed. Visual intelligence was also limited, with only one drone consistently operating over Gaza, and its camera not always active. The report concludes that while there was no negligence, there was a "perceptual fixation" that prevented recognition of the immediate threat, and that presenting the full intelligence picture to a single entity might have triggered a higher alert.

Key figures involved in discussions included then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Commander of the Southern Command Yaron Finkelman, and Head of the Operations Directorate Oded Basiuk. However, the Commander of the Air Force, Tomer Bar, was not updated, and the Head of Military Intelligence, Aharon Haliva, while updated, did not participate in the critical overnight situation assessment.