IDF Knew Hamas Chief Deif Was in Hiding Before Oct. 7 Attack
Translated & summarized from i24NEWS French by baba
Israeli intelligence detected Hamas commander Mohammed Deif moving to a safe house hours before the October 7 massacre but did not strike due to uncertainty about his identity. Alerts regarding SIM card activations and suspicious Hamas member behavior were also downplayed in the hours leading up to the attack. The IDF commander of the Southern Sector assessed that intelligence did not indicate an impending war. The full scale of the Hamas assault was not anticipated despite accumulating concerning intelligence.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Israeli intelligence identified Hamas chief Mohammed Deif in a safe house hours before the Oct. 7 attack.
- The IDF did not strike Deif due to uncertainty about his identity, according to new reports.
- Multiple intelligence alerts regarding Hamas activity were received and assessed as routine or non-exceptional.
- The commander of the Southern Sector believed Hamas activities were normal and not indicative of war.
- The full scale of the Hamas assault was not anticipated despite accumulating intelligence.
- The Shin Bet and IDF Southern Command received alerts about SIM card activations and suspicious behavior.
Israeli security forces received intelligence indicating that Hamas commander Mohammed Deif had moved to a safe house hours before the October 7 massacre, according to new revelations. The intelligence, gathered on the night of October 6-7, 2023, detected unusual activity from Deif, who had been off the radar. His movement to an emergency shelter was seen as a potential precursor to an imminent operation.
Israeli security services identified the activation of this site and the presence of an individual believed to be Deif. However, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated they lacked certainty it was the Hamas military chief, which is why no strike was ordered. The information was reportedly passed to the then-commander of the Southern Sector, General Yaron Finkelman.
During a 3 a.m. situation meeting, Finkelman assessed that Hamas's elite Nukhba forces were engaged in routine activities and that the gathered intelligence did not indicate an impending war. These revelations add to previously documented alerts that have emerged from internal IDF investigations.
Earlier alerts on October 6 included the Shin Bet informing Southern Command intelligence officers about the activation of dozens of SIM cards in Gaza, which was deemed non-exceptional. Later, around 2.5 hours after that, new intelligence reported unusual behavior among Hamas members, but checks concluded it was normal activity. At midnight, suspicious behavior from another Hamas member prompted an intelligence officer to alert the Southern Sector commander, raising the possibility of a surprise, but localized, operation.
Further SIM card activations and suspicious behavior from Hamas members were reported around 2:30 a.m., along with unusual movements in Hamas's rocket array. These were not interpreted as preparations for a major offensive. Hours later, Hamas launched its attack on Israel. The cumulative intelligence, despite its concerning nature, did not lead to anticipating the scale of the assault.
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