New Intel Revealed Missed Opportunity to Target Hamas Commander Before Oct. 7
Translated & summarized from Kikar HaShabbat by baba
Hours before the October 7th Hamas attack, Israeli intelligence received a significant indication that Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif was using his underground command center, suggesting an imminent offensive. Despite deploying a drone to confirm his presence, the intelligence remained unverified. Senior Shin Bet officials considered a rare opportunity for a targeted strike against Deif. In hindsight, Deif was indeed in the command center, directing preparations for the attack. Other signs, like unusual anti-tank missile activity and rocket launcher preparations, were also missed, contributing to a lack of timely warning.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Israeli intelligence had a significant indication of Hamas's imminent attack hours before Oct. 7, but failed to confirm it.
- Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif's use of his underground command center indicated an immediate offensive was planned.
- A drone mission to confirm Deif's presence near Khan Yunis was unsuccessful in providing definitive intelligence.
- Senior officials considered a rare opportunity for a targeted strike against Deif if his presence was confirmed.
- Other intelligence signs, including rocket launcher preparations, were also overlooked before the attack.
- A "conceptual blindness" at high levels prevented recognition of Hamas's immediate offensive intentions.
New intelligence, cleared for publication by Israeli censors, reveals that security forces had a significant indication hours before the October 7th Hamas attack that could have altered the situation, but failed to confirm it in real-time. Around midnight on the eve of the attack, both the IDF and the Shin Bet received an unusual report: Mohammed Deif, the head of Hamas's military wing, was actively using his underground emergency command center in Khan Yunis. The use of this strategic asset, reserved only for emergencies, indicated to the security establishment that Hamas was preparing for an immediate, large-scale offensive. However, there was also a possibility that maintenance crews or assistants were merely checking the facility's readiness, a routine occurrence for Hamas.
The central intelligence puzzle that night for the Shin Bet and Southern Command was identifying who exactly entered the command center. To resolve this, urgent resources were deployed, including an Air Force drone diverted from the West Bank to Gaza. The drone arrived near Khan Yunis in the early morning hours and conducted targeted surveillance around the complex, but failed to find definitive signs of Deif's presence, leaving the intelligence unclear.
Amidst this dramatic information, it has now emerged that senior Shin Bet officials were considering a special operational alert. They seriously discussed the possibility of a rare opportunity for a targeted strike against Deif that night if his presence could be confirmed. Sources privy to the matter stated that conclusive proof of Deif's presence would have drastically changed the system's response, escalating alert levels and leading to immediate warnings of an attack. This was considered the most troubling indication among all the "red flags" that night.
Only in hindsight, during post-event investigations, did the full picture emerge: Mohammed Deif did indeed enter his emergency command center around midnight and managed the final preparations for the attack from there. However, the intensive intelligence effort to solve the puzzle yielded no definitive answer until 6:29 AM, when Hamas launched its surprise assault on the Gaza border communities.
Alongside the drama surrounding Deif, another intelligence indication from that night that did not receive due weight has also been revealed. Intelligence systems detected unusual movements in Hamas's anti-tank missile array and observed the removal of tarpaulins from rocket launchers across the Strip. Despite the clear accumulation of these signs, including the tarpaulins and Deif's command center activation, a "conceptual blindness" at high levels prevented the recognition of the enemy's immediate offensive intentions, leaving Israel without a meaningful warning until the breach of the border.
