Netanyahu Chose Coalition Partners for Legal Interests, Not Coerced
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose to form his current government with ultra-Orthodox and far-right parties to advance his personal legal interests, not because he was forced to, argues Nadav Tamir. This coalition is driven by each partner's independent interest in weakening the judiciary, which serves Netanyahu's goal of influencing his trial. The liberal camp's main error was excluding Arab citizens from the fight for democracy, failing to connect it to ending the occupation and achieving equal rights.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Benjamin Netanyahu chose his coalition partners to advance his legal interests, not due to coercion, according to Nadav Tamir.
- Netanyahu's primary goal since his indictment is to influence the outcome of his trial, Tamir claims.
- Ultra-Orthodox, Smotrich, and Ben-Gvir each have independent interests in weakening the judiciary, Tamir states.
- The liberal camp's error was excluding Arab citizens from the fight for democracy, Tamir argues.
- Tamir suggests the Former Minister can correct this by building a broad democratic camp including Arab citizens.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not reluctantly form his current government with ultra-Orthodox and far-right parties; rather, he actively chose them to advance his personal legal interests, according to an opinion piece by Nadav Tamir. The author argues that the prevailing claim within the unity bloc, suggesting that a "anyone but Bibi" policy forced Netanyahu into this coalition, is factually incorrect.
Tamir asserts that Netanyahu's primary motivation since his indictment has been to influence the outcome of his trial, a goal facilitated by a coalition that supports altering the balance of power between the government and the judiciary. He points to statements by Yair Lapid and Avigdor Lieberman, who characterized the judicial overhaul as a move to save Netanyahu rather than a genuine legal reform. Benny Gantz also viewed it as an attempt to reshape the regime to benefit Netanyahu and potentially Aryeh Deri.
Previous governments involving Netanyahu with centrist figures like Gantz in 2020, or the emergency government post-October 7, did not pursue significant legal reforms, indicating Netanyahu's need for partners with a vested interest in weakening the judiciary. The ultra-Orthodox parties seek exemptions from military service, Bezalel Smotrich aims for de facto annexation and settlement expansion, and Itamar Ben-Gvir desires policies that would undermine the rights of Arab citizens in Israel, all seeing the judiciary as an obstacle.
Tamir contends that the liberal camp's true mistake was not refusing to join Netanyahu's government but excluding Arab citizens from the struggle for democracy. He argues that Palestinian citizens of Israel, having legitimate grievances against the legal system for its role in the occupation and discrimination, understand the importance of defending democratic principles. However, many Israeli liberals shied away from acknowledging the occupation or Palestinian national identity, focusing solely on Israeli democracy without recognizing its incompatibility with denying rights to millions of Palestinians.
This strategic error, Tamir concludes, was separating the fight for democracy from the fight to end the occupation and achieve equal rights. He suggests that the Former Minister has an opportunity to rectify this by building a broad democratic camp that includes Arab citizens as full partners, potentially alongside a religious contingent willing to perform civil service, to safeguard Israeli democracy.
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