Channel 13Security20:35

Ex-IDF Chief Halevi: Oct. 7 Was a Preventable Failure, Not an Inside Betrayal

Translated & summarized from Channel 13 by baba

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Hebrew · 8 newsrooms covering

Former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi described the October 7th attack as a preventable failure, not an inside betrayal, at a New York conference. He stressed the need for a state inquiry and asserted that military pressure in Gaza was key to hostage returns. Halevi denied any internal betrayal, citing a lack of evidence and the complexity of such an act. He also acknowledged that Israeli actions inadvertently killed hostages and that the IDF learned from these mistakes.

The story in 6 lines · by baba

Former IDF Chief Herzi Halevi called Oct. 7 a preventable failure, denying any inside betrayal.
Halevi stated military pressure in Gaza was essential for the return of hostages.
He asserted that a state inquiry is necessary for Israel's healing process.
Halevi dismissed internal betrayal theories, citing a lack of evidence after three years.
He acknowledged that Israeli bombs unintentionally killed hostages, leading to improved intelligence.
Halevi noted Hamas leader Sinwar's efforts to surprise Israel and his belief Israel wouldn't maneuver in Gaza.

Ex-IDF Chief Halevi: Oct. 7 Was a Preventable Failure, Not an Inside Betrayal — Editorial illustration generated by baba News, not a photograph of the event.

Former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi stated that the October 7th Hamas attack was a "preventable failure" but unequivocally denied any "inside betrayal." Speaking at the "Shurat HaDin" conference on combating antisemitism in New York, Halevi emphasized that a comprehensive state inquiry is crucial for Israel's healing process. He asserted that without significant military pressure in Gaza, the return of hostages would not have been possible.

Halevi directly addressed conspiracy theories of internal betrayal, stating with 100% certainty that no such betrayal occurred. He called on political leadership to publicly reject these claims, explaining that he understands the events of October 7th in detail and does not believe any colleague, after decades of risking their lives, would aid Hamas. He noted that facilitating such betrayal would require a large network, and after three years, no such individual has been found.

Regarding the concept of absolute victory, Halevi mentioned the difficulty in convincing political echelons to maneuver within Gaza, breaking the pattern of smaller operations based solely on air strikes. He reiterated that strong military pressure inside Gaza was essential for hostage recovery, acknowledging that Israeli bombs unfortunately killed hostages, an unintended consequence of not knowing their precise location. He stated that the IDF underwent an accelerated learning process to improve hostage location accuracy.

Halevi explained that the initial priority was Iran, then Hezbollah, and finally Hamas, as they did not anticipate Hamas initiating such an attack. The prevailing assessment within the IDF, Shin Bet, and political leadership was that Hamas did not desire war, aiming instead to demonstrate its ability to manage Gaza's population and potentially control the West Bank. He acknowledged that Hamas invested heavily in fostering this perception.

Halevi attributed the surprise to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar's efforts to attack simultaneously and his belief that Israel would not maneuver in the Strip due to its perceived complexity. He revealed that a message was sent to Hezbollah on the late morning of October 7th, warning of severe repercussions if they made any move, despite the surprise in Gaza.