Court Limits Netanyahu Trial Witness Questioning of Ex-AG Mandelblit
Translated & summarized from Arutz Sheva by baba
The Jerusalem District Court has limited the scope of questioning for former Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit in the Benjamin Netanyahu trial, restricting his testimony to approvals he granted. The defense wanted to question him on subsequent investigative actions and information he received, but the court largely sided with the prosecution's objection. Attorney Dr. Liran Ohayon suggests a test to balance defendant rights with prosecutorial independence, focusing on factual basis rather than internal deliberations.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- The Jerusalem District Court limited former AG Avichai Mandelblit's testimony in the Netanyahu trial.
- The defense sought to question Mandelblit on post-approval investigations and information received.
- Judge Moshe Bar-Am dissented, citing potential factual deficiencies from limited testimony.
- Attorney Dr. Liran Ohayon proposed a test to balance defendant rights and prosecutorial independence.
- The proposed test focuses on information presented to decision-makers, not their internal deliberations.
Former Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit is set to return to the witness stand in the Benjamin Netanyahu trial on Monday, November 2. The Jerusalem District Court recently ruled, by a two-to-one majority, to restrict his testimony. The state had opposed broader questioning, and the court accepted this objection, limiting Mandelblit's examination to the approvals he granted as Attorney General.
The defense, which summoned Mandelblit, sought to question him about investigative actions taken after these approvals and the information presented to him at the time. Reports indicate that Judge Moshe Bar-Am was the dissenting voice, questioning how the court could ignore potential "illegal actions" and stating that omitting such testimony could lead to a "factual deficiency."
Attorney Dr. Liran Ohayon proposes a test to balance defendants' rights with prosecutorial independence. He argues that while defendants have the right to claim "defense from justice" if crucial information was withheld from decision-makers, questioning should focus on the facts presented, not internal deliberations. Ohayon suggests that questions about whether specific information reached the decision-maker before their ruling are permissible, as they examine the basis of an administrative decision without revealing internal thought processes.
Questions concerning drafts, consultations, or internal considerations should be blocked, according to Ohayon. He acknowledges that the defense can seek evidence from other witnesses and documents, but maintains that only the Attorney General can directly testify to what he personally knew. Ohayon believes this approach protects prosecutorial discretion while still allowing for examination of the information relied upon, ensuring that decisions on "defense from justice" claims are based on a complete factual record.
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