Trump's Unity Government Plan for Israel: A Three-Party Rotation

An Israeli historian, Kobi Barda, suggests a potential US-brokered unity government for Israel involving a three-way rotation of Prime Ministers: Benjamin Netanyahu, Gadi Eisenkot, and Naftali Bennett. Barda argues this scenario is plausible given the current political deadlock following recent elections, where no single bloc secured a clear majority. He dismisses other options, such as Eisenkot forming a coalition with Arab parties or Netanyahu pushing for new elections, as politically unfeasible or too risky.

The proposed plan centers on Donald Trump's personal interest in brokering a "historic agreement" between Israel and Saudi Arabia, dubbed "Abraham Accords 2.0." Trump's motivations include solidifying his legacy, countering China's technological and energy influence through projects like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and personal economic interests. Trump might convene Netanyahu, Eisenkot, and Bennett in Washington to exert pressure for this unity government.

Under this proposed rotation, Benjamin Netanyahu would serve as Prime Minister until July 2028, potentially followed by a pardon and a move to the presidency. Gadi Eisenkot would then serve until January 2030, with Naftali Bennett leading the government until the next elections. Netanyahu's initial term is justified by Likud being the largest party, and the deal would offer him a path to the presidency and protection from legal issues. Eisenkot would gain premiership experience, and Bennett could fulfill campaign promises, such as drafting ultra-Orthodox men into the military.

Barda posits that Trump's previous intervention in Israeli politics, which he believes shifted election trends, indicates his willingness to impose a solution. Trump reportedly opposes a government including far-right figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, as Saudi Arabia has stated it will not normalize relations with Israel if such parties are in the coalition. This unity government, excluding radical parties, would allow Netanyahu to distance himself from his usual partners and present a focused government to voters, while preventing a potential power imbalance within the coalition.

This model is compared to the 1984 Israeli national unity government rotation between Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Shamir, which emerged from a similar political stalemate and successfully implemented significant economic reforms. Barda concludes that while this solution may be unpalenting for all involved, its very difficulty makes it the most realistic path out of Israel's current political quagmire.