Iran's Control Over Allies Questioned Amid Financial Strain

A traditional funding structure that has long supported Tehran's allies is reportedly facing significant limitations, according to an analysis by Gershon Kogan for "Segodnya." U.S. Central Command chief Admiral Brad Cooper suggested in mid-October that Iran-aligned regional groups might be withholding payments to their fighters to redirect funds to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is itself experiencing budget shortfalls. If true, this would fundamentally alter the Middle East's geopolitical dynamics.

However, the analysis cautions that this claim comes from a party engaged in an "economic war" with Iran, and Cooper's statements are based on operational intelligence rather than confirmed facts. Historically, Iran channeled oil revenues through the IRGC to its proxies. For instance, the U.S. Treasury reported that Tehran sent approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah in the first ten months of 2025, with varying monthly stipends for fighters in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

While sanctions and a naval blockade have indeed reduced Iran's export revenues and frozen crypto assets, limiting its ability to fund allies, the U.S. narrative is questioned. The analysis argues that if the IRGC lacks funds for its own salaries, it would prioritize resources for weapons and logistics over redirecting small amounts from rank-and-file fighters. Furthermore, an examination of the situation reveals distinct scenarios in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, rather than a uniform shift in financial flows.

In Lebanon, despite financial channel disruptions, Hezbollah continues to disburse salaries and maintain social obligations. In Iraq, local militias reportedly receive direct funding from the state budget, with surpluses flowing to Iranian entities. Information from Yemen is scarce, but the overall trend suggests Tehran is economizing.

For Israel, this situation presents three key strategic implications: the primary vulnerability of Iran's network lies in its logistical and shadow financial channels, not just oil revenues; economic pressure could make the IRGC more dangerous as it attempts to raise the stakes; and Baghdad is emerging as a crucial financial hub, shifting the center of financial gravity closer to Iraq. Ultimately, Iran is compelled to shift the financial burden to its proxies, making them more reliant on local budgets and businesses, which in turn weakens their central control and poses a risk of losing manageability over its allies.