Israeli Analyst: Israel Fails to Learn Key Lesson Since October 7

Israeli analyst Amit Yagur argues that since the October 7th attacks, Israel continues to underestimate the ideological and religious motivations of its adversaries. Yagur, a reserve lieutenant colonel, stated in an article for Maariv that Israel's national security approach remains overly focused on military power and intelligence data, neglecting the significant role of religious ideology and public sentiment. He believes this oversight risks repeating past mistakes.

Yagur points out a persistent issue within Israel's security system and Western analytical circles: the tendency to explain enemy actions through material interests, troop numbers, and weaponry, while downplaying religious beliefs and ideological drivers. For years, politicians, security officials, and researchers assumed that weakening an enemy's military, applying economic pressure, and diplomatic agreements would ensure long-term peace. However, Yagur contends that the events of October 7th exposed the dangers of this perspective.

He cites Yahya Sinwar's promotion of a temporary truce, known as 'hudna,' as a realistic path to de-escalation, noting that Israeli officials may have believed this scenario because it aligned with their expectations. Yagur stresses that analyzing military capabilities alone is insufficient without understanding the ideological underpinnings that shape an enemy's goals. He advocates for incorporating religious motivations and attitudes toward Israel into assessments alongside intelligence on weapons, infrastructure, and organizational activities.

Yagur also addressed the situation in Gaza, arguing that economic recovery and humanitarian aid alone do not account for the influence of religious ideology on public mood. He referenced lectures by Dr. Rami bin Muhammad al-Dali, a Gaza-based lecturer of Islamic law, who reportedly presents religious prophecies about the destruction of Jews not as abstract beliefs but as justifications for future events, including war-induced suffering. Yagur believes such ideological tenets must be studied to understand settlement prospects, as economic incentives alone cannot overcome what radical movements consider religious obligations. He also urges analysis beyond the leadership of armed groups to include the broader societal environment where these views are formed.

Extending his analysis to Europe, Yagur criticizes viewing threats from radical Islam solely through migration, crime, or political extremism. He suggests religious radicalization can manifest in attacks on Christian sites, desecration of religious symbols, and the formation of isolated communities. He also accused Qatar and Turkey of supporting Islamist entities that use social and humanitarian initiatives to expand their influence, noting that these claims reflect his position and were not independently verified in the material. Yagur also commented on the decline of Christian communities in the Middle East, attributing it partly to persecution and displacement.

Yagur's core conclusion is the need to revise national security threat assessment principles. He believes intelligence services and political leadership overemphasize quantitative metrics like missile counts and military targets, while underanalyzing enemy ideology. He draws parallels to historical intelligence failures like Pearl Harbor. Ahead of the 2026 elections, Yagur calls on politicians to explain how they will incorporate religious and societal factors into security policy, opposing the notion that job creation or targeted strikes alone can stop terrorism. He posits that "Since 2023, the world has been in an open war of civilizations for identity." Yagur asserts that Israeli authorities must consider ideological drivers alongside military capabilities to understand strategic goals and public support, and that voters should demand clear explanations from politicians on how their threat perceptions have evolved since October 7th.