Israel Reverts to Original National Defense Doctrine
Translated & summarized from Makor Rishon by baba
Israel is returning to its original national defense doctrine, emphasizing proactive offense and initiative to neutralize threats, as outlined in a new concept by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This marks a departure from the post-1990s strategy of deterrence and intelligence warnings, which proved insufficient on October 7. The updated doctrine prioritizes preemptive action and decisive victories, aligning with the IDF's efforts to rebuild its maneuvering capabilities and integrate multi-branch forces to counter emerging threats effectively.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Israel is returning to its original national defense doctrine, emphasizing proactive offense and initiative.
- The new doctrine, published by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, replaces the post-1990s strategy of deterrence and warning.
- The original doctrine, from David Ben-Gurion's era, focused on transferring fighting to enemy territory and achieving swift victories.
- The previous strategy proved insufficient, notably failing to prevent Hamas's rearmament and the October 7th attack.
- The updated approach prioritizes preemptive action and decisive, multi-branch military capabilities.
- This shift aims to rebuild the IDF's ability to neutralize threats before they materialize.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recently published national security concept signals a return to Israel's original national defense doctrine, a shift away from a strategy adopted in the early 1990s. This new approach emphasizes proactive offense and initiative to neutralize threats before they materialize, acknowledging the limitations of deterrence and intelligence warnings alone.
The original doctrine, championed by David Ben-Gurion in 1950, posited that a small nation lacking strategic depth must not defend itself solely on its borders or wait for the enemy to choose the time of attack. Instead, it advocated for taking the initiative, transferring the fighting to enemy territory with mobile forces and firepower, and achieving swift, decisive victories to dictate the terms of peace. The IDF was built in the early 1950s as an army designed for rapid decision-making, ready to preemptively remove threats.
In contrast, the early 1990s saw an unofficial shift to a "three-legged" strategy of deterrence, warning, and decision. However, the article argues that deterrence relies on the enemy's will, and intelligence warnings can be delayed or fail. The effectiveness of this strategy eroded from the mid-1990s, with the IDF gradually transforming into a force focused on deterrence and attrition, a concept that proved insufficient in the 2006 Second Lebanon War and the 2014 Operation Protective Edge, allowing Hamas to rearm.
The 2006 Meridor Commission recommended strengthening defenses, including active measures like Iron Dome, in response to evolving threats. However, by 2016, terror groups had developed mobile, maneuvering forces capable of infiltrating Israel, while the IDF continued to reduce its maneuvering capabilities. This left Israel vulnerable to a large-scale surprise attack and the potential occupation of communities, as tragically demonstrated on October 7.
The Prime Minister's new concept re-centers preventive action and offensive initiative, including the possibility of a preemptive strike, alongside strengthening home front defense, achieving munitions independence, and maintaining technological superiority. This aligns with the Chief of Staff's recent emphasis on lessons learned and rebuilding the IDF's decisive, maneuvering capabilities. The article concludes that a fully closed circle will be achieved when the IDF is rebuilt as an integrated, multi-branch force capable of neutralizing threats as they emerge, rather than merely blocking them after they have materialized.
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