Rabbis Debate Halachic Permissibility of Voting for Parties Without Rabbinical Guidance
Translated & summarized from Arutz Sheva by baba
Rabbis Binyamin Tuvadi and Yehuda Zoldan debated the halachic permissibility of voting in elections. Rabbi Tuvadi argued that voting for parties consulting rabbis on major issues is allowed, but not for those acting against religious judgment. Rabbi Zoldan questioned the necessity of an "important person" being exclusively a Torah scholar, suggesting expertise in the relevant field is key. The discussion centered on whether religious considerations must guide political decisions.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Rabbi Binyamin Tuvadi stated it's permissible to vote for parties consulting rabbis on significant issues.
- Rabbi Tuvadi argued it's forbidden to vote for parties acting against religious judgment.
- Rabbi Yehuda Zoldan questioned if an "important person" must be a Torah scholar.
- Zoldan emphasized that any advisor must have expertise in the relevant field.
- The debate focused on the halachic permissibility of voting in elections.
A religious discussion between Rabbi Binyamin Tuvadi and Rabbi Yehuda Zoldan explored the halachic (Jewish legal) permissibility of voting in elections, particularly concerning parties that do not consult with rabbis. Rabbi Tuvadi argued that it is permissible to vote for a party that consults with rabbis on significant matters, but forbidden to support a party acting against religious judgment. He referenced a Talmudic passage from Bava Batra concerning a group of ritual slaughterers who established a work-sharing agreement, explaining that some early commentators required the approval of an "important person" for such agreements to be valid. Tuvadi extended this principle to national leadership, stating that if a party consults with a rabbi or a group of important rabbis on major issues, voting for it is permitted. Conversely, he asserted that it is forbidden to vote for a party that "turns its back on the Torah" and is known to act in ways that are unreasonable from a religious perspective.
Rabbi Zoldan expressed reservations about defining an "important person" exclusively as a Torah scholar. He noted that some early commentators interpreted this term to mean an appointed, objective, and knowledgeable individual, not necessarily a rabbi. Zoldan emphasized that even a Torah scholar must possess expertise in the specific area requiring a ruling. Rabbi Tuvadi agreed on the need for expertise but maintained that certain decisions involve religious questions that professional or legal considerations alone cannot adequately address. He pointed out that legal and general ethical standards do not always align with religious judgment, even when decisions are legally sound and morally acceptable by broader human standards.
