Lieberman's 'Accused Law' Plan Aims to Block Netanyahu

Ten days before the Israeli Knesset elections scheduled for October 27, 2026, Avigdor Lieberman, chairman of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, proposed a plan to prevent Benjamin Netanyahu from forming the next government. The plan begins with electing a new Knesset Speaker to replace Amir Ohana, followed by the approval of what Lieberman calls the "Accused Law." While Lieberman has not provided specific text detailing the law's conditions or effective date, his timing highlights the challenges facing the anti-Netanyahu bloc. Although these parties agree on ending Netanyahu's tenure, they differ on how to form a successor government, making it difficult to achieve a majority to oust him legislatively or politically.

The initiative stems from a dispute between Lieberman and Gadi Eisenkot. Eisenkot suggested forming a minority government with 58 or 59 Knesset votes and expanding it later, a proposal Lieberman rejected, insisting on a government based on "Zionist" parties. Lieberman also accused Eisenkot of negotiating with Netanyahu, a political accusation. Competition also exists over leadership within the opposition, with Lieberman criticizing Eisenkot's campaign to grow his party at the expense of allies. A Yisrael Beiteinu official stated the party would recommend Lieberman for prime minister.

Lieberman's plan can be seen as an attempt to influence opposition negotiation tactics before election results are known. He aims to use the new parliament to restrict government formation options and then compel parties to negotiate under his proposed legislation. Lieberman has not ruled out cooperating with Likud without Netanyahu, suggesting his goal is to change the ruling bloc's leadership rather than its party composition. However, this assumes a willingness within Likud to abandon Netanyahu, for which Lieberman's statements offer no concrete evidence.

Arab parties present a significant challenge to the plan. While opposition factions discussed cooperating with the Joint List and the United Arab List to elect a Knesset Speaker, Lieberman refuses to rely on their votes for government formation, either directly or indirectly, and also excludes the Haredi parties. This means Arab votes could shift parliamentary power, but some opposition leaders are unwilling to acknowledge this influence when selecting governing partners, limiting their options.

The majority needed to elect a Knesset Speaker differs from that required to amend the Basic Law on Government. Article 44 requires at least 61 votes in all three readings. An agreement on a parliamentary procedure does not guarantee support for legislation changing eligibility for the premiership. While the Knesset has amended the Basic Law before, it remains uncertain if there's readiness for a new amendment targeting a specific politician. Even controlling the Knesset speakership doesn't bypass the procedural steps for enacting a law or resolve inter-party disagreements on its immediate application.

A temporal obstacle also exists. The Election Committee set November 4 as the deadline for results, with the new Knesset convening on November 10. Basic law requires the President to task someone with forming a government within seven days of the results. This allows the President to task Netanyahu before the new Knesset can legislate or complete the "Accused Law," making its impact on an already-issued mandate unclear. Any text proposed by Lieberman would need careful consideration of its effective date and relation to ongoing constitutional procedures.

The legislation also faces questions about changing the rules for power competition to target a specific individual. While restrictions on the premiership can be justified by public integrity, applying them to an indicted individual without a final verdict raises questions about the presumption of innocence and the personal nature of the amendment. The Supreme Court has previously intervened in cases with personal implications, suggesting Lieberman's proposal could face judicial review and delays, potentially limiting its immediate impact on forming the next government.

Politically, the plan might yield results different from Lieberman's stated goal. A law preventing Netanyahu from forming a new government wouldn't automatically end his current term, as the principle of government continuity keeps the existing government in power until a new one gains Knesset confidence. While Lieberman urged anti-Netanyahu parties to focus on winning, Yediot Ahronot interpreted his plan as a potential prelude to repeat elections that Netanyahu might be unable to contest if prevented from forming a government. This scenario, a journalistic inference rather than a stated goal, suggests that attempts to block Netanyahu could lead to his continued leadership of a transitional government if the opposition fails to agree on an alternative.

These factors indicate Lieberman is trying to solve a political problem with a legal amendment, while government formation difficulties are also linked to the competition for opposition leadership and some parties' refusal to broaden coalition options. A majority might agree to prevent Netanyahu's mandate or change the premiership's conditions without agreeing on a governing program. They could pass a law but fail to translate its outcome into actual change in the executive branch. Therefore, Lieberman's plan highlights the gap between preventing a prime minister from renewing his term and the ability to form another government, a gap that legislation alone cannot bridge.