Psychologist Loses License for Two Years Over Relationship With Former Patient

A clinical psychologist, identified only as M., from northern Israel, has had her license suspended for two years by the Ministry of Health's disciplinary committee. The severe penalty jeopardizes her livelihood and future career. The committee cited two main reasons for the decision: first, continuing a therapeutic relationship after a romantic connection developed with a patient, and second, engaging in a romantic and intimate relationship with the patient approximately three months after therapy concluded, violating the mandatory three-year cooling-off period.

These actions led to a disciplinary conviction for exceeding professional and ethical boundaries. The patient, N., did not file the complaint and testified that the relationship was consensual. M.'s lawyer, Eran Kayzman, argued that the relationship was between two consenting adults and appealed the license suspension to the Haifa District Court, calling it a "crime without a victim."

Despite the argument of consent, the disciplinary committee ruled that the absence of a prior identical case in Israel did not prevent them from imposing a suspension. Prosecutor Jonathan Berg stated that this was the first such case of sexual relations with a former patient to reach a disciplinary-legal proceeding. The committee members, Efrat Rosenblatt, Yehonatan Dabbah, and Robert Epstein, wrote in their ruling that disciplinary law must address new cases and clarify professional boundaries.

The facts of the case are not disputed. M. continued treating N. for about eight months while experiencing romantic feelings, which could have significantly impacted the therapy. The therapy began in June 2020, and N. expressed feelings for M. several months later, a phenomenon known in psychology as "transference." While M. initially advised N. to see another therapist and reflected that a relationship would not materialize, N. objected. Subsequently, M. also developed romantic feelings, which she disclosed to N., and continued the treatment instead of immediately terminating it. During this period, M. also separated from her partner.

The complaint was filed by M.'s therapeutic supervisor and manager at the health fund. The committee emphasized that while they do not judge personal feelings or choices, the relationship originated within a therapeutic context governed by professional rules. The ruling stated that M.'s punishment is necessitated by the breach of public trust in psychological treatment. The committee noted that even if no specific personal harm is proven, the primary damage is to public confidence in the profession and its boundaries. They also argued that allowing M.'s defense of "no dependency" or "consent" would enable any therapist to deviate from prohibitions by claiming special circumstances.