Israel Faces Demographic Shift: Haredi Education to Outpace State System
Translated & summarized from Makor Rishon by baba
A new study predicts that by 2030, Haredi children will outnumber those in Israel's state education system entering first grade. The research highlights concerns over the economic impact of low labor participation among the Haredi and Arab sectors, which rely heavily on state funding. The article criticizes current solutions, such as Naftali Bennett's "Servicemembers Law," as insufficient, arguing the core issue is the welfare state model itself. It suggests that reducing the welfare state is key to addressing the problem of dependency and distorted incentives.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- By 2030, Haredi first-graders are projected to exceed those in Israel's state education system.
- The study raises economic concerns due to low labor participation in Haredi and Arab sectors.
- The article argues the welfare state model, not demographics, is the core problem.
- Proposed solutions like the "Servicemembers Law" are deemed insufficient by the author.
- Haredi communities are described as adept at utilizing system rules for benefits.
- Reducing the welfare state is presented as a potential solution to dependency issues.
A new study indicates that by 2030, more Haredi children than those in the state education system will be entering first grade in Israel. The research, conducted by Eli Morgenstern, founder and CEO of the economic-strategic consulting firm 'Empire' and former head of education in the Ministry of Finance's budget department, highlights a trend that has been developing for years. This demographic shift raises concerns about a future Israel composed of non-Zionist populations, specifically the Arab and Haredi sectors, and poses challenges to the Israeli economy due to the low labor participation rates of these groups, which are heavily reliant on state funding. The article argues that the core issue is not the demographic numbers themselves, but the system that supports them. The critical economic question is not how many Haredi children are born, but what future opportunities will be available to them and how their families will sustain themselves.
Opposition figures, while acknowledging parts of the problem, are criticized for proposing inadequate solutions. For instance, Naftali Bennett's proposed "Servicemembers Law" aims to reallocate approximately 25 billion shekels from benefits given to the Haredi community and coalition funds to reservists, offering benefits like a million shekel grant for a first home, free daycare, and discounts on property taxes, electricity, and public transport. However, the article contends that this approach merely redirects funds rather than addressing the fundamental issue of extensive benefits. It suggests that as long as the "tap" of benefits remains open, individuals will find ways to exploit it, and that the system creates distorted incentives by offering less in taxes and services while dictating how people spend their money.
The Haredi community is described as adept at navigating and utilizing the system's rules to their advantage. Examples include the allocation of a significant portion of "price-per-unit" housing to Haredi communities due to the influence of Haredi ministers and directors, and the exploitation of tender criteria such as number of children, low per capita income, lack of prior home ownership, and lower socioeconomic rankings of Haredi neighborhoods. Attempts by various governments to close loopholes by changing criteria or adding requirements like "employment potential" are seen as temporary fixes, as Haredi children are disproportionately represented among those eligible for subsidized daycare, with around 55% of eligible children coming from the Haredi sector. The article concludes that the underlying problem lies not in the rules of the game but in the welfare state model itself, which relies on massive taxation and redistribution. This model, it argues, fails to account for populations whose value systems prioritize separation from general society and reliance on internal mechanisms, suggesting that reducing the welfare state would consequently reduce the problem.
