Israel's October 2026 Elections: A Crossroads for Governance and Arab Representation

Israel is heading towards the Knesset elections scheduled for October 27, 2026, amidst a profound political, security, and social crisis. These elections transcend mere party competition, raising fundamental questions about the future of governance, the relationship between the political establishment and society, and the position of Arab citizens within the Israeli political system. The upcoming vote follows the repercussions of the October 7th attacks and subsequent wars, which have fueled disputes over political responsibility for security failures, the future of Gaza, West Bank settlements, and Israel's international relations.

The elections are no longer a traditional contest between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his rivals, but rather a test of the competing blocs' ability to form a stable government, given declining political trust and ongoing divisions within Jewish society. Mid-October polls indicate that Netanyahu's Likud party faces serious competition, but varying results and the difficulty of securing a clear parliamentary majority make definitive predictions premature. Securing the most seats does not guarantee government formation; an 120-member Knesset majority and a sustainable coalition are required.

Netanyahu's weaknesses include the persistent debate over responsibility for the security failures preceding October 7th, alongside disagreements on war management, government priorities, and the influence of far-right and ultra-Orthodox parties. Opposition forces, including those associated with Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, and Yair Lapid, are positioning themselves as alternatives capable of resetting domestic and foreign priorities. However, these factions hold differing views, particularly on security and Palestinian issues, complicating the formation of a future government even if Netanyahu's bloc weakens.

Regardless of the next government's composition, Israel faces complex challenges: the future of Gaza, relations with Palestinians, northern border tensions, war costs, social crises, and declining institutional trust. A change in prime minister does not automatically alter core state policies due to ideological gaps and the continued influence of security and national considerations. Therefore, distinguishing between changing political faces and changing actual policies is crucial, especially for Arab citizens and their parties.

The Joint List and the United Arab List hold particular significance, as Arab representation can influence parliamentary power balances and coalition negotiations. This influence depends on unified stances, clear demands, and the willingness of Arab parties to coordinate, as well as other parties' readiness to engage with them as legitimate political partners. The divergence between the Joint List and the United Arab List reflects differing approaches to engaging with Israeli governments: the United Arab List has pursued coalition participation and direct negotiation for community budgets, while elements within the Joint List emphasize national and civil rights and confront discriminatory policies independently.

Regardless of the approach, the question remains: what is the value of partial achievements if they do not lead to sustainable change in the status of Arab citizens and the policies affecting their daily lives? Coalition participation has shown that securing budgets is insufficient to address crime, housing crises, demolitions, resource disparities, and gaps in education, health, and employment. These issues also require legislative action, state agency priorities, and effective implementation and oversight. Any Arab party entering a coalition needs a written agreement with clear objectives, timelines, budgets, and accountability mechanisms. Relying on general promises, as with the United Arab List in previous elections, makes achievements contingent on shifting political balances.

Conversely, the Joint List cannot assume that Arab party unity alone will bring about comprehensive political change. Electoral unity can enhance representation but requires a shared program, effective leadership, and a realistic strategy for translating seats into parliamentary influence. Any discussion of the Joint List's decisive role must be based on actual election results and seat distribution, not on assumptions about its ability to prevent or form a government.

The choice for both lists is not necessarily full organizational merger, but a clear political coordination framework, either through a unified electoral list when circumstances permit, or a declared agreement on core issues and parliamentary work. This includes combating organized crime, addressing discrimination, resolving housing and planning crises, reviewing detrimental legislation like the Kaminitz Law, ensuring equitable budget distribution, and expanding educational and employment opportunities. Both lists must also agree on clear criteria for evaluating any future government, moving beyond theoretical stances on participation or opposition. Recommending a candidate for prime minister, supporting a government from outside the coalition, or joining a formal coalition are distinct constitutional and political options, each with conditions and risks. Decisions should be tied to the responsiveness to Arab demands, guarantees for their implementation, and the ability to prevent Arab participation from becoming mere political cover without tangible benefits.

Ultimately, the October 27th elections offer a chance to test Israel's political balances but do not guarantee radical policy shifts. The challenge for the Joint List and the United Arab List is to move from internal competition to responsible coordination, from electoral rhetoric to binding programs, and from promises to implementation and accountability mechanisms. True political power is measured not only by the number of seats but by the ability of their holders to protect their constituents' rights and achieve tangible change in their lives, with a clear strategy to oust the Prime Minister and his party, who harbor many laws and legislations not only against Gaza and the West Bank but also against Arab citizens in the country.