Lieberman's Political Maneuvering Could Save Netanyahu, Analyst Argues
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
Analyst Dan Peri argues that politician Avigdor Lieberman's refusal to accept parliamentary support from Arab parties for an opposition government could inadvertently save Prime Minister Netanyahu. Lieberman's stance, while acknowledging genuine ideological difficulties, risks prolonging Netanyahu's tenure, which the author believes has damaged Israel. The author suggests Lieberman might be engaging in political maneuvering for personal gain, a move that could alienate his own supporters and undermine the opposition's chances of forming a government.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Avigdor Lieberman's refusal to accept Arab party support may save Prime Minister Netanyahu's government.
- The opposition has a clear path to power, but Lieberman's red lines could thwart it.
- A government with Arab party support could enact crucial reforms, despite inherent compromises.
- Lieberman might be maneuvering for personal political advantage, risking national unity.
- The author criticizes the center-left's failure to unite behind a clear leader.
Avigdor Lieberman faces a critical decision that could define his political legacy: whether to allow a change of government with external Arab party support, or to insist on red lines that, according to the author, might offer Prime Minister Netanyahu a political lifeline. The opposition, according to polls, has a clear path to power, with Arab parties offering parliamentary support. However, Lieberman's insistence on rejecting this support risks saving Netanyahu, the primary target of his political career.
Lieberman's reservations about relying on Arab parties are acknowledged, citing their stances on Zionism, national security, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which present genuine difficulties for parties committed to Israel's Jewish and democratic character. A government needing their external support would involve unavoidable compromises, weaknesses, and tensions. Yet, the alternative is another Netanyahu government, potentially a transitional one, propped up by extremist and sectoral forces that have, in the author's view, caused immense damage to Israel's security, democratic institutions, economy, and international standing.
Even a temporary government with Arab party support could bring immediate improvements, such as establishing a commission of inquiry for the October 7th events, combating Jewish terrorism, addressing crime in the Arab community, and beginning the restoration of democratic institutions. Parliamentary support from outside the coalition would enable such a government while maintaining a crucial distinction between its constituent parties and those enabling its formation. Lieberman's outright refusal, the author contends, would turn a political preference into an absolute prohibition, thereby giving Netanyahu an undeserved reprieve.
The author suggests Lieberman might be calculating that difficulties in forming an opposition government will strengthen his bargaining position, potentially allowing him to challenge Gadi Eisenkot's leadership bid or demand a rotation agreement, similar to Naftali Bennett's rise in 2021. While this tactic aligns with Lieberman's reputation as a shrewd tactician, it is deemed a reckless gamble that could alienate supporters and dampen the momentum for change. This situation highlights the center-left's failure to unite behind a clear leader, leaving the opposition vulnerable to personal ambitions and leadership struggles during a period of national vulnerability.
