Trump's Signal to Netanyahu: Israel May Stand Alone Against Iran

Washington hopes that sanctions will compel Iran to concede without further strikes, while Tehran believes rising oil prices are pushing the U.S. toward a compromise. In Israel, statements by President Donald Trump regarding Iran are often viewed with skepticism, akin to weather forecasts, worth noting but not for planning. The article, written by political commentator Anna Barsky for Maariv, suggests that the question of a new strike on Iran is also intertwined with Israel's upcoming October 27 parliamentary elections, with some believing a well-timed operation could boost Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's campaign by focusing on security and leadership against an external threat.

However, Trump has indicated he will not strike before November 3, after the Israeli elections. For a U.S. operation to influence the vote, Trump would either need to reverse his statement or escalation would have to occur through a different scenario. Even then, political calculations assume a brief, successful strike away from U.S. territory. Any Iranian retaliation, potentially causing Israeli casualties and disrupting flights at Ben Gurion Airport, would likely occur in the final days before the election, making election polling less of a priority for the Likud party.

The core issue remains in Washington: is Trump nearing a decision to attack Iran, or is he using threats to extract concessions? Even if he decides to strike, the article questions how this would end the war, noting that previous U.S. and Israeli operations, while damaging Iran's military capabilities, failed to secure political concessions. To achieve a different outcome, clear objectives for U.S. demands and a mechanism for Tehran's agreement are needed. Without these, increased destruction may not lead to a resolution.

Despite significant Iranian losses, export disruptions, a U.S. naval blockade, and intensified economic pressure, including a reported zeroing of Iran's crude oil exports in October according to Vortexa, Tehran has not agreed to a deal or capitulated to U.S. demands. Trump's previous attempts to avoid a large-scale attack through blockade, sanctions, and threats have shown that Iran can be severely damaged without yielding desired concessions. The U.S. is hesitant to relinquish its main leverage without substantial gains, leading to a stalemate where each side awaits the other's move.

The temptation to use force again arises if blockades and threats fail. This approach assumes that further destruction will compel Iran's regime to compromise. For Tehran, abandoning uranium enrichment and nuclear stockpiles after prolonged bombardment and blockade could be seen as admitting defeat. As the conflict becomes a test of the regime's resilience, making significant concessions is increasingly difficult to frame as a victory. While Iran cannot match U.S. naval and air power directly, it can disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, attack regional energy infrastructure, and raise the economic cost of the conflict for the U.S.

Tehran aims to make President Trump reconsider the ultimate cost of victory. Having endured strikes in previous years, Iran signals it will not offer a symbolic response this time. The extent of Iran's remaining missile and drone capabilities is uncertain, posing a risk for the U.S. The weakening of Iran's military potential makes predicting its response more complex; a regime fearing the loss of its deterrent capabilities might use remaining assets forcefully and early. This is a critical factor for Trump to assess before ordering a major attack.

In late September and early October, U.S. naval and air forces appeared to restore tanker protection and shipping volumes through the Strait of Hormuz, which the U.S. administration presented as a success. However, this proved temporary as Iran intensified attacks, damaging at least nine vessels in the first week of October and causing Brent crude oil prices to exceed $105 per barrel. The U.S. defense efforts failed to maintain previous shipping levels. Iran's attacks, targeting areas where Trump sought to demonstrate U.S. success, are strategically aimed at influencing American voters concerned about rising energy prices. These price hikes provide opponents of the war with a strong argument, highlighting continued U.S. costs despite months of pressure.

As the midterm elections approach, Trump faces pressure to explain the lack of stability in the oil market. Two senior Iranian officials described rising oil prices and shipping attacks as tactics to influence the U.S. elections. Even after significant losses, including damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' radar systems, Iran uses small boats for reconnaissance and can disrupt shipping by raising risks for companies, insurers, and cargo owners, potentially reducing transit volumes without further direct attacks. While Washington believes the blockade weakens Iran, Tehran sees rising oil prices and shipping disruptions as pushing Trump toward compromise. Both sides view damage inflicted on the adversary as validation of their strategy, suggesting the confrontation will continue until one side miscalculates. The danger is amplified by differing metrics of success: the U.S. focuses on economic and military damage to Iran, while Iran assesses the cost of the war for the U.S.