Netanyahu's Office Document Contradicts His Account of Pre-Oct. 7 Decisions

A document prepared by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's staff shortly after the October 7th attacks contradicts the Prime Minister's version of his role, according to journalists Ronen Bergman and Yuval Rubovich. The document, submitted in response to the State Comptroller's preliminary report, indicates that political leadership, under Netanyahu, "required postponing confrontations with Hamas and preserving its rule in Gaza." This revelation gains significance following a lawsuit filed against Netanyahu by former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar. The lawsuit, filed in the Central District Court, is seen by the authors as the closest substitute for an independent investigation in the absence of a state commission.

Bar's lawsuit details Netanyahu's reaction to Shin Bet proposals from July 2023, which warned of Hamas strengthening its power, increasing its forces, and inciting terror, alongside a growing threat of multi-front conflict. Shin Bet recommended restoring deterrence through Israeli-initiated military rounds and expanded counter-terrorism operations. Netanyahu, after reviewing the document, wrote that "in a democracy, Shin Bet is not responsible for formulating the national strategy of the State of Israel" and that the recommendations were "not a directive from the head of Shin Bet," asserting his sole authority as Prime Minister.

The 92-page document, prepared by Netanyahu's own staff, explicitly states that "political leadership's instructions regarding Gaza in recent years included, among other things: postponing confrontations; relying on the barrier; periodic strikes; preserving Hamas as an effective authority that restrains itself and others." It further acknowledges that this strategic approach led the IDF to abandon the goal of defeating Hamas, encouraging the search for "alternatives to defeat." The document suggests these policies directly influenced Hamas's decision to attack on October 7th, by diminishing Israel's perceived deterrence and willingness to engage in ground warfare.

Bergman and Rubovich argue that these findings directly contradict Netanyahu's claims of being a "lone captain" undermined by negligent military and intelligence leaders. The document, they state, places responsibility on Netanyahu for neglecting Israel's security concept and abandoning the principle of defeating adversaries. The journalists highlight that the document was prepared by Netanyahu's staff in response to the State Comptroller's report, suggesting that at the time, a cohesive narrative of blame had not yet been fully established within the Prime Minister's circle.

The article also details how Netanyahu, despite warnings from the National Security Council about discrepancies between the political directive and the IDF's multi-year "Tnuva" plan, failed to convene the security cabinet to address these issues. This led to the IDF's continued reduction of ground forces and tanks, a strategy his own staff later described as a "dangerous gamble." The journalists conclude that Netanyahu, as the "captain," steered the ship directly towards the "reef of October 7th."