Netanyahu Accused of Directing Policy That Led to October 7th Disaster

A lawsuit filed by former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu includes documents alleging Netanyahu's government directed policies that weakened Israel's deterrence and contributed to Hamas's October 7th attack. In July 2023, the Shin Bet submitted a planning document warning of Hamas's consolidation of power, military buildup, and increasing terrorism in Gaza, recommending a restoration of deterrence through proactive operations. Netanyahu, in his own handwriting on the document, asserted that the Shin Bet is not responsible for national strategy and that his directives were not to be questioned. His office has previously been unresponsive to questions regarding his handwritten notes, including one stating Hamas was deterred, contradicting his later claims that this was the intelligence community's assessment.

Despite Netanyahu's formal authority as prime minister to set national policy, the lawsuit centers on whether he actually did so and what strategy he established. A 92-page document, prepared by Netanyahu's own staff in response to a draft state comptroller report in April 2024, directly contradicts Netanyahu's public narrative. This document, later incorporated into the State Comptroller's November 2025 report, details how government directives over the years prioritized delaying confrontations, relying on border defenses, and maintaining Hamas as a governing entity, thereby avoiding decisive action. It states these policies "filtered down into the operational concept of the IDF regarding the avoidance of defeating Hamas" and encouraged seeking "alternatives to defeat."

The internal document further asserts that Israel's neglect of key deterrence components, specifically the "classic concept of defeat" and the importance of offensive ground maneuvers, directly influenced Hamas's decision to launch the October 7th attack. The document, authored by Netanyahu's team, effectively admits that the military followed explicit instructions from the Prime Minister's Office to avoid escalation and maintain quiet with Hamas. Specific directives from Netanyahu in April 2019 and May 2020 are cited, along with a July 2023 National Security Council presentation, all emphasizing maintaining quiet and treating Gaza as a secondary theater.

The State Comptroller's report also noted a continuous erosion of Israeli deterrence, partly due to the lack of response and failure to exact a price for Hamas's actions, which deprived the Shin Bet of a key counter-terrorism tool: offense. The report highlights that when Israel's deterrence-based security concept collapsed, the country was left vulnerable, with an assumption that intelligence would provide timely warnings. The article also details how former IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi's multi-year plan, "Tnufa," which emphasized technological superiority and intelligence while cutting traditional ground forces, was not adequately discussed or funded by Netanyahu's government, despite warnings from the National Security Council about the gap between policy and military buildup.

Netanyahu's narrative of being a captain undermined by insubordinate generals is dismantled by these documents. The article concludes that Netanyahu's strategy involved avoiding difficult decisions on military buildup and prioritizing quiet with Hamas, leading directly to the October 7th disaster. The article also touches on Netanyahu's efforts to prevent investigative committees and his alleged attempts to distort historical records to shift blame onto security officials, who have since resigned and called for a state inquiry, unlike Netanyahu, who has not taken responsibility.