Hamas Prepares for Post-IDF Withdrawal Era in Gaza

Hamas is actively preparing for a future scenario where the IDF withdraws from parts of the Gaza Strip, aiming to preserve its forces, weaponry, and infrastructure to regain control. Three years after the October 7th attacks, sources indicate the organization is working to maintain its Rafah and northern Gaza brigades, intending to redeploy them when possible. Concurrently, Israel is systematically disarming areas east of the "yellow line" to hinder Hamas's ability to rebuild its strength. Hamas has previously buried rocket components and weapons east of this line for future use, but Israel's ongoing efforts are focused on clearing these areas. The surface-level clearing is largely complete, with structures containing terror infrastructure or weapon caches destroyed, and some found to have underground components or explosives. The second phase, focused on clearing underground infrastructure, is ongoing, involving special equipment to locate tunnels and controlled demolitions or concrete injections to destroy them. These efforts have yielded results, such as the elimination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in the Rafah area due to tunnel destruction. Israel currently controls 63% of Gaza, encompassing areas where Hamas brigades operated, forcing them westward. While this disrupts Hamas's structure, the organization views these units as reserves for a potential future return to areas like Rafah and Beit Hanoun.

Despite Israeli government claims of Hamas planning attacks before elections, sources report significant resource limitations for the terror group. Hamas is estimated to possess only a few hundred rockets, a fraction of its pre-war arsenal, significantly reducing its capacity for large-scale attacks. There is also a shortage of light weaponry, with some items unproducible by Hamas and others of poor quality. Recruitment continues, including teenagers as young as 16-17, but their training is basic, often lasting only a week, a stark contrast to the extensive training before October 7th. This decline in training quality impacts the military wing's capabilities. While targeted assassinations of senior Hamas officials are ongoing, a comprehensive offensive in the Strip's depths is deemed necessary for complete defeat. However, these assassinations are believed to be eroding Hamas's deterrence and control over the civilian population, evidenced by recent militia raids west of the yellow line and the capture of Hamas internal security chief Mu'een al-Arabeed. Hamas continues to embed itself in civilian infrastructure like schools, mosques, and hospitals, despite denials. The organization's civilian network, including "charitable societies," mosques, educational systems, and its financial arm, is also crucial. The leadership of this network, the Political Bureau in Gaza, has been significantly impacted, with new appointees considered weaker figures, such as Ali al-Aamoudi, the recent head of the bureau and a close associate of Sinwar. The presence of other terror groups like Islamic Jihad, which still commands thousands of fighters, complicates the situation, as they also attempt to recover despite similar limitations. The fight against Gaza's terror elements is far from over.