New Article Suggests Sinwar Used Secret Talks as Deception Tactic

A new article proposes that the secret channel of communication managed by Soufian Abu Zeida between Israel and Hamas may have also served as part of Yahya Sinwar's deception plan. The article focuses on a meeting scheduled for October 8, the day after the October 7th attack.

Dr. Soufian Abu Zeida, a former senior Fatah official, was revealed as "Coal Eyes," the source who received an unusual message from Yahya Sinwar weeks before the October 7th attack. Dahhouk-Halevi suggests that while Abu Zeida and the Israeli side viewed the contacts as a genuine attempt to advance a settlement, Sinwar may have also used the channel to reinforce the impression that Hamas was not interested in conflict. According to the article, these contacts proceeded concurrently with Hamas's continued military preparations for the attack and the concealment of these preparations from Israel.

One key detail supporting this assessment relates to the last meeting between Abu Zeida and Sinwar before the attack. They met on September 14, 2023, two days after a Hamas military drill that simulated, among other things, taking over communities in the Gaza envelope. During the meeting, Sinwar requested to convey a strong message to Israel to advance the talks, and a subsequent meeting was set for October 8, just one day after the Hamas attack was launched. Dahhouk-Halevi states that the scheduling of the October 8 meeting could have contributed to the Israeli perception that Sinwar still sought to continue on the path of settlement.

The article further claims that the deception plan was integrated with Hamas's assessment of Israel's internal situation during 2023. Dahhouk-Halevi points to Hamas documents, statements, and publications indicating the organization closely monitored Israel's political crisis and reservist soldiers' announcements about ceasing volunteer service, viewing these developments as potentially weakening the IDF's readiness and Israeli deterrence.

According to the article, in July 2023, the military intelligence of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades even recommended that Sinwar avoid a military confrontation at that stage to allow Israel's internal crisis to deepen. Dahhouk-Halevi argues that subsequent developments reinforced the Hamas leadership's assessment that Israel was at a point of weakness that could be exploited. The author notes that Hamas had been planning a large-scale attack for years, and various signs of the organization's unusual activity were received in Israel before October 7th. However, the security establishment did not assess that Hamas was about to launch the plan immediately.

The analysis suggests that the combination of calming messages, ongoing settlement talks, and the concealment of military preparations might have been part of a broader effort to maintain the perception in Israel that Hamas desired quiet and economic relief. In this context, the possibility of another meeting with Abu Zeida on October 8 is presented as a component that could have contributed to the smokescreen Sinwar created for the attack. Dahhouk-Halevi emphasizes that this does not imply Abu Zeida was aware of the plan; rather, the article's assessment is that if the channel was indeed part of the deception, Abu Zeida himself might have been a "duped partner," acting to promote a settlement in good faith while Sinwar exploited it for a different purpose.