Ex-Mossad Official: Responsibility for Oct. 7 Extends Beyond Intelligence Agencies
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
A former Mossad official, Chaim Tomer, stated that the Mossad shares overall responsibility for the October 7th failures, not just Aman and Shin Bet. He called for legislative changes regarding national risk assessment, arguing it's currently placed on intelligence agencies. Tomer also suggested political considerations may have favored Hamas control of Gaza. Another speaker, Ben-Hanan, noted a lack of organizational memory to address pre-existing attack scenarios.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Former Mossad official Chaim Tomer stated the agency shares overall responsibility for the October 7th failures.
- Tomer criticized self-assessment conclusions that placed primary responsibility solely on Aman and Shin Bet.
- He called for legislative changes in how Israel assesses national-level risks.
- Tomer suggested political considerations may have influenced policies regarding Hamas control of Gaza.
- Another speaker, Ben-Hanan, highlighted a lack of organizational memory to address known attack scenarios.
A former senior official at Israel's Mossad intelligence agency, Chaim Tomer, has criticized the self-assessment conclusions regarding the failures leading up to the October 7th Hamas attacks, stating that the Mossad cannot be absolved of its "overall responsibility" for the intelligence failures. Speaking at the International Counter-Terrorism Conference at Reichman University, Tomer argued that the responsibility for the October 7th failures does not solely rest with the IDF's Directorate of Military Intelligence (Aman) and the Shin Bet security agency.
Tomer, who experienced the intelligence failures of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, asserted that the Mossad, as a leading intelligence player, must share in the collective responsibility. He further contended that the issue extends beyond the division of responsibility among intelligence bodies, calling for a legislative change in how the nation assesses national-level risks. According to Tomer, the current practice of placing the burden of national risk assessment on intelligence organizations is a significant part of the failure, akin to a "conception" or ingrained assumption.
He also touched upon the political considerations that may have influenced policy, suggesting that some Israeli governments may have found it politically advantageous for Hamas to control Gaza, a policy potentially separate from military considerations and sometimes even documented. Tomer emphasized the importance of understanding the enemy as rational actors with clear goals and means, not as irrational or foolish individuals.
Another panelist, Ben-Hanan, noted that a clear intelligence scenario of a multi-pronged Hamas attack from Gaza had existed since Operation Protective Edge in 2014. However, he stated that organizational mechanisms to challenge these fundamental assessments were not developed, and on the night of October 6-7, there was a lack of "organizational memory" to recognize the strategic warning signs, likening the situation to the biblical "walls of Jericho" falling without a proper response to the conception and strategic alert.
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