How Liberals Enabled the Destruction of Gaza

An article published in September 2017 by Bezalel Smotrich, now Finance Minister, outlined a "decisive plan" to deny Palestinians national aspirations, framing it as a realistic, geopolitical strategy rather than a religious manifesto. Smotrich's deliberate detachment of the plan from its religious underpinnings was key to its eventual acceptance, as he anticipated it would face no opposition when the opportune moment arose. The journal "Hashiloach," which published Smotrich's article, is funded by the American Tikvah Fund, which also supported the Kohelet Forum, instrumental in the judicial reform proposals. "Hashiloach" enjoys intellectual legitimacy, with its right-wing viewpoints often drawing academic critique rather than outright condemnation. Liberal academics even encouraged students to participate in Tikvah Fund programs.

Yoav Shuruk, then editor of "Hashiloach," co-authored a paper in February 2024 advocating for the "voluntary emigration" of at least 75% of Gaza's population as a policy goal. Shuruk's intellectual standing among liberals contrasted with the treatment of other religious figures. His approach, detailed in his book "The Israeli Alliance," resonated with trends in Jewish renewal seminaries and pre-military academies seeking to define an "Israeli Judaism" centered on state sovereignty rather than religious observance. This ideology appealed to liberals who shared similar concepts and viewed religious-state issues and "burden sharing" as central societal divides, aiming to marginalize the Haredi parties.

Smotrich's plan gained intellectual traction, with liberal critics dismissing him as a fringe "dangerous fundamentalist" and overlooking how neutralizing the religious aspect of his political program made it palatable. While the article appeared in a publication associated with Naftali Bennett, who became a liberal favorite, Smotrich was perceived as belonging to a different, "messianic" and irrational right, distinct from the "good" liberal-aligned right. The prevailing "conflict management" paradigm was challenged only by Smotrich's alternative. Even during the "change government," which saw incremental steps to displace Palestinians in the West Bank, Smotrich's plan progressed. Ministers like Yisrael Katz and Yoav Gallant issued veiled threats to Palestinians regarding the Nakba.

The election of the right-wing government in November 2022 marked a new coalition dynamic, uniting Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, representing a blend of Ashkenazi religious-Zionist elites and lower-middle-class Mizrahi voters. This alliance, bridging often antagonistic local groups, reflected a convergence of interests between the "blue-collar army" and settlers. Ben-Gvir's focus on "governability" and addressing crime and protection rackets for small businesses aimed to extend the settler-security force integration into civilian life, framing Palestinians within Israel as a security problem. The liberal opposition failed to counter the "governability" discourse, instead contrasting Ben-Gvir's gang-like violence with the more refined methods of the security establishment.

The article draws parallels to the rise of Andrew Jackson in the U.S., suggesting a dynamic common in settler societies where non-dominant groups push for expansion and conflict. The initial move by the right-wing government was to weaken the judiciary, which, despite not being a bastion of Palestinian rights, still provided limited protections. The liberal response, after years of depoliticization, was to protest the weakening of the court system, focusing on judicial independence and separation of powers. However, many protesters, excluding fringe groups, overlooked how this weakening served to remove legal obstacles to expansionist policies. The liberal embrace of the Supreme Court, symbolized by the "I love Bagatz" slogan, positioned it as a shield against international legal challenges, rather than questioning the militaristic approach itself.

Despite the threat of reservist refusal, protests faltered during the May 2023 Gaza operation and the July Jenin operation, with protest leaders even canceling demonstrations. A "60 Minutes" interview with Shira Ettinger, a combat pilot and protest leader, revealed a focus on who makes decisions about dropping bombs on civilian areas, rather than questioning the act itself. This highlighted the distinction between the right's "gangster" violence and the center-left's "legitimate" institutional violence. The issue was not avoiding war crimes but the court's ability to shield perpetrators internationally. This was the political climate before October 7th.

Smotrich saw the October 7th attack as an opportunity, advocating for ruthlessness, while the liberal camp framed brutal force as necessary for hostage recovery, denying its direct risk to them. The military establishment also rejected Hamas's early offer for a comprehensive deal. The liberal movement eventually prioritized a deal for the hostages, implying an end to Gaza's destruction. Intellectuals within the liberal camp focused on condemning campus protests and the "global left," labeling any identification of Zionism or Israeli control with colonialism as "antisemitic." They presented October 7th as uncontextualized violence against Jews, legitimizing the destruction of Gaza.

Aharon Barak's representation of Israel at the International Court of Justice in the genocide case brought by South Africa, and his past Supreme Court rulings that enabled the occupation, exemplified the liberal alignment. Barak portrayed Israel as a "civilizational victim" defending European values against "barbarians." This discourse, while opposing renewed settlement in Gaza, focused on confronting the religious-Zionist right over settlement farms and ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, framing settler violence as "wild west" criminality. The liberal movement's focus on the settlement farm project, however, failed to articulate a broader stance against Israel's constant expansionism and use of force, partly due to the dominance of liberal figures in military units conducting strikes in Lebanon and Iran.

Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly managed to co-opt opposition by highlighting technological superiority as a point of contention with the Haredim, linking it to core curriculum studies and Haredi conscription. The liberal movement's focus shifted to demanding Haredi conscription and opposing Haredi parties, creating contradictory positions: one seemingly limiting violence and the other accelerating militarization. This failure to reconcile these stances prevented leveraging internal right-wing tensions for de-militarization. The death penalty vote, where Yisrael Beiteinu supported it and Yahadut HaTorah opposed it, was a missed opportunity for the liberal movement to define its boundaries. The liberal approach also involved dividing Palestinians within Israel, legitimizing some like Mansour Abbas while delegating others, and supporting efforts to disqualify Arab political candidates.

Three years after October 7th, the limitations of the liberal-right divide are clear. The judiciary, under attack by the right, simultaneously legitimizes its policies. It has facilitated the destruction of Gaza and ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, while also removing protections for Palestinians in Israel and restricting their political representation. The liberal inability to recognize the broader context enabling right-wing policies confines it within the right's Overton window, normalizing potentially fascist horizons. The "decisive plan" continues to shape Israeli politics, and an alternative requires overcoming not only the right but also this window of political imagination, which traps it in ongoing colonialism and genocide. The only alternative presented is bi-nationalism.