IDF's Inability to Win Wars, Not Budget, Is Core Problem

A senior fellow at the Misgav National Security Institute, Alon Eyal, argues that Israel's ongoing military engagements are not due to an insufficient defense budget, but rather a fundamental shift in the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) doctrine. In a response to an article by Ofer Shelah, Eyal contends that the IDF transformed from a decisive force to one focused on deterrence and attrition in September 2006. This change, he explains, prevents the military from achieving swift, conclusive victories, leading to prolonged conflicts.

Eyal criticizes Shelah's assertion that Israel is "addicted to war" and should pursue political solutions to end constant fighting. Instead, Eyal posits that the inability to end wars decisively is a result of the IDF losing its professional capacity to achieve victory. He points to the Winograd Commission's findings after the Second Lebanon War, which recommended returning the IDF to a decisive force model, a recommendation he claims has not been implemented.

The author highlights that the current generation of commanders inherited this doctrine and did not invent it, but they are responsible for not correcting it. He argues that the prolonged use of reservists since October 7th is a consequence of this doctrinal shift, turning them into the primary cost-bearers of the inability to conclude wars. Eyal dismisses political agreements as a substitute for military strength, stating that agreements can only solidify outcomes achieved by force.

Ultimately, Eyal asserts that the primary question is not how much money the IDF receives, but what kind of army the budget is intended to build. He concludes that the leadership of the military and the state, along with public watchdogs, must abandon the illusion that Israel can be defended without the professional capability to decisively defeat its enemies.