Israeli Property Tax Discounts Favor Large Low-Income Families, Deepening Municipal Deficits
תומצת מתוך Calcalist על ידי baba
Israel's property tax discount system heavily favors large low-income families, especially ultra-Orthodox ones, encouraging low workforce participation and increasing municipal deficits. Recent reforms expanded discounts but deepened biases, costing 1.1 billion shekels annually and disproportionately benefiting Haredi communities. Critics call for reforms linking discounts to employment efforts and targeting genuine hardship.
הידיעה ב-6 שורות · תקציר של baba
- Property tax discounts in Israel favor large low-income families, mainly ultra-Orthodox, encouraging low employment.
- April reforms expanded eligibility by 100,000 households and increased average discounts by 25%, costing 1.1 billion shekels yearly.
- Haredi families benefit more from discounts than Arab families, who claim them less frequently.
- Discounts increase municipal deficits, requiring state balancing grants funded by taxpayers.
- Critics argue property tax should not be a social welfare tool and call for work-related eligibility criteria.
- Political influence from Shas sustains policies favoring certain populations in the Ministry of Interior.
An Israeli journalist recounts his experience applying for property tax (arnona) discounts as a university student, highlighting the system's bias toward large low-income families, particularly in Jerusalem. The author explains that while discounts are available for low earners, the criteria heavily favor families with many children, often benefiting ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) households more than others. For example, a young couple earning about 13,000 shekels monthly with one child does not qualify for a discount, but adding more children significantly increases the discount percentage, reaching up to 90% for four or more children. This structure encourages low workforce participation and larger families.
In April, the Ministry of Interior revised the discount rules, expanding eligibility by 100,000 households and increasing the average discount by 25%, at an estimated annual cost of 1.1 billion shekels. However, an analysis by the Ministry of Finance found that the reform worsened existing biases rather than correcting them. While discounts increased for both Haredi and Arab populations, the Haredi community benefits disproportionately, with 65% eligible post-reform compared to 53% of Arab families, who also tend to claim discounts less frequently.
The author criticizes the Ministry of Interior for exacerbating municipal budget deficits by expanding discounts primarily in poorer areas like Jerusalem, Beit Shemesh, the Negev, and parts of the West Bank, which then require state balancing grants funded by taxpayers. He argues that property tax, intended to fund local services, should not serve as a social welfare tool, a role better suited for income tax and social security. The current system, he says, rewards non-working families and discourages employment, contradicting economic logic and fairness.
The article calls for reform that requires proof of effort to work or legitimate inability before granting discounts, targeting assistance to genuinely needy families rather than those choosing low income or large family size as a lifestyle. The author notes the political influence of the Shas party in the Ministry of Interior, which perpetuates these policies. Ultimately, the piece exposes how complex discount tables conceal significant social and fiscal inequities, urging greater transparency and smarter social policy integration.
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