Israel Faces Growing US, European Pressure on Aid and Policy

Israel's next prime minister will confront diminishing support in the United States, potential sanctions from Europe, and uncertainty surrounding future security assistance. A significant challenge may also arise domestically, as policy decisions could clash with coalition stability. For decades, Israel relied on broad bipartisan backing in the U.S. for security aid and strategic cooperation. However, this consensus has eroded recently, particularly concerning the Gaza war, West Bank policies, and settlements. This shift is evident in legislative proposals to restrict arms deals, demands for stricter oversight of U.S. weaponry, and calls for sanctions against individuals involved in settlement activities. While some proposals haven't become binding policy, their advancement in Congress signals weakening support among Democratic lawmakers. Such political criticism could lead to aid conditions, delayed arms deals, or increased scrutiny of U.S. military equipment usage.

Congress possesses considerable power to influence foreign policy through budget approvals, arms deal oversight, hearings, and demanding explanations from administration officials. Relying solely on a relationship with former President Donald Trump could prove misguided. The prime minister and foreign minister must maintain close ties with the current president and re-establish dialogue with Democratic leadership, as over-reliance on one party risks alienating the other. Policy adjustments in Jerusalem aimed at improving relations with Democrats might provoke opposition from the Republican administration or within Israel's own coalition government, depending on its composition.

Strategically, the upcoming administration must prepare for the expiration of the $38 billion, ten-year U.S.-Israel security assistance agreement in fiscal year 2028. Negotiating its successor will occur amidst growing controversy over aid to Israel in American politics. The current agreement includes $33 billion in military financing and $5 billion for missile defense, subject to congressional appropriations. Ensuring Israel's future security needs and preventing its policies from imposing restrictive conditions on aid will be paramount. Discussions will also cover continued cooperation on missile defense systems, acquiring advanced weaponry, and maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge.

In Europe, the government will face different pressures, primarily concerning settlements. Construction in the territories, the legalization of outposts, and settler violence have become central issues in relations with European nations. Beyond diplomatic condemnations, measures have been taken against individuals linked to violence in the West Bank. Britain has imposed sanctions on settlers and organizations involved in West Bank violence, and the EU has adopted similar measures. There is concern these actions could expand beyond specific individuals and organizations, impacting trade, research, and institutional cooperation with Europe. The EU is a major trading partner, and its relations with Israel involve economic agreements and scientific collaborations. Escalating political conflict could affect these areas as well.

Significant European decisions are subject to institutional procedures and member state consensus, requiring engagement with both EU institutions in Brussels and national governments. The association agreement between Israel and the EU, a cornerstone of their economic and political relations, is of particular sensitivity. Any damage to this agreement or its benefits could carry substantial economic and diplomatic costs. Research and innovation programs, like Horizon Europe, are also valuable assets Israel must protect. Suspension of benefits under the association agreement and restrictions on participation in research programs are subject to legal frameworks and decision-making processes, with varying economic implications. If such steps are advanced, the government must work with member states and EU institutions to prevent or limit their scope.

These decisions could lead to internal coalition conflicts. Limiting construction or avoiding unilateral actions in the West Bank might ease international pressure but could spark internal opposition. Conversely, accommodating demands for settlement expansion could intensify conflict with Europe and hinder relations with the U.S. Coalition partners opposing such decisions could exert pressure through government meeting opposition, legislative delays, Knesset votes, or threats of a coalition crisis. Disputes over settlement policy could also disrupt government work in other areas. The difficulty will be acute if international demands involve changing existing policies. Halting construction, increasing enforcement against illegal outposts, or taking steps to strengthen the Palestinian Authority might be seen internationally as necessary gestures but could cause principled disputes within the coalition. Even after a decision is made, the prime minister must ensure coalition partners allow its implementation. The more the coalition majority depends on factions opposing concessions in the Palestinian arena, the less capacity the prime minister will have to make decisions that alleviate international pressure.

Adding to these challenges is Israel's ongoing crisis in international image. The Gaza war, civilian casualties, and international legal proceedings have intensified criticism in Western countries and international bodies. The Foreign Ministry will need to contend with governments, critical public opinion, boycott campaigns, and initiatives to restrict cooperation with Israeli entities. Public diplomacy alone cannot improve Israel's image; decisions made by the government and the reality on the ground will be crucial. The foreign minister must strengthen diplomatic missions, restore damaged relationships, and engage with political and public opinion leaders. The Palestinian issue will continue to overshadow relations with the West. European countries will demand a political horizon from Israel, while the government must define its policy toward the Palestinian Authority and its stance on the future of the Gaza Strip. Issues of civilian control, security mechanisms, reconstruction, and Arab state involvement will require close coordination with Washington, alongside independent decisions in Jerusalem. A major dispute is expected over Israel's desire to maintain security freedom of action in Gaza, while involved nations seek a stable governance mechanism. Any future arrangement must address Hamas's status, Palestinian responsibility for Gaza's administration, Arab state involvement, and oversight of reconstruction funds. Each option will present the prime minister with security, political, or diplomatic costs, or all three.

Concurrently, the prime minister must address the Iranian threat and manage intelligence operations. The Mossad will continue its role in monitoring Iran's nuclear program, countering external threats, and maintaining covert ties with foreign intelligence services. The Shin Bet will handle terror threats and security challenges in the Palestinian arena and within Israel. The prime minister must foster trust with agency heads, ensure the professional independence of their assessments, and strengthen the National Security Council's coordination. Regarding Iran, the prime minister faces a direct policy decision with Washington. If the U.S. administration favors a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue, Israel must define its required limitations and oversight mechanisms, its approach to Iran's missile program, and its desired operational freedom in case of a deal violation. Disagreements with Washington on these matters could impact intelligence cooperation, security coordination, and Israel's ability to garner international support for actions against Iran. Iran's activities through regional militant groups will also require the government to balance security responses, U.S. coordination, and diplomatic efforts with regional states.

The foreign minister must also address the ministry's standing within the government. With many policy decisions made in the Prime Minister's Office, the National Security Council, and through security channels, the Foreign Ministry must be involved in policy formulation, not just its external presentation. This requires a coordinated diplomatic apparatus capable of identifying anti-Israel initiatives before they become decisions, maintaining continuous contact with lawmakers and opinion shapers, and articulating clear policy positions. Without full participation in decision-making, even extensive diplomatic efforts may only mitigate the damage of decisions made without its input. Ultimately, the new prime minister will need to balance competing interests. Israel requires U.S. support, European cooperation, and security operational freedom against regional threats. Decisions that benefit Israel in one area may create difficulties in another. The toughest political test will arise when a move to secure U.S. aid, preserve European relations, or advance a Palestinian settlement faces internal government opposition. The prime minister will then have to decide how much coalition stability is worth risking to pursue policies deemed essential for Israel's security and global standing.