Arab Parties Face Political Partnership Test After Recommending Eisenkot

Following the recent elections, Arab parties holding 19 Knesset seats have recommended Gadi Eisenkot to form the next government, presenting a significant political test for the "change bloc." The core question is whether this bloc will accept genuine political partnership with Arab parties or merely utilize their parliamentary support without granting them influence in decision-making. This situation is highlighted on the anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin's assassination, who in 1992 recognized the importance of external parliamentary support from Arab parties for his government.

The recommendation by all Arab lawmakers to task Eisenkot with government formation signals their desire to move beyond the political periphery and participate in decision-making. However, it places Eisenkot in a critical position: will he see this as an opening for true political partnership, or will he only use their support for government formation and ending Benjamin Netanyahu's tenure?

While Rabin did not formally include Arab parties in his coalition in 1992, he relied on their external parliamentary backing, which provided a crucial safety net. He understood their parliamentary strength as a vital part of the political equation. Today, despite increased Arab representation, some leaders in the change bloc reportedly reject any understanding with Arab parties, even outside a coalition. This raises questions about the nature of the proposed political change if a significant elected force is excluded from shaping it.

The article points to Avigdor Lieberman's stance as an example of this duality, showing flexibility towards potential cooperation with ultra-Orthodox parties while firmly rejecting engagement with Arab parties. The presence of an Arab Knesset member within Lieberman's party is seen as insufficient for recognizing the rights of elected Arab parties to represent their constituents and negotiate independently.

Eisenkot's 67 recommendations do not guarantee a majority, but they impose a clear political responsibility. The Arab parties have stated their position, and now Eisenkot must clarify his: does he view them as a political force for understanding, or does he only want their recommendations without acknowledging their right to influence policy?

The responsibility also lies with the Arab parties to move beyond mere recommendations and develop a unified negotiation strategy. Their 19 seats necessitate proactive engagement, linking parliamentary support to concrete demands for equality, budgets, crime reduction, personal security, planning, construction, and civil and collective national rights for Arab citizens. The legacy of Rabin's assassination prompts a direct question: will the change bloc leverage Arab parliamentary power as Rabin did, or will they seek Arab votes without acknowledging their right to partnership? Eisenkot, Lieberman, and other change bloc leaders must clarify their positions, while Arab parties must ensure their support is based on specific demands and enforceable political guarantees. The 19 seats should not be merely an electoral asset for others to use and then disregard when distributing influence.