US, Israeli Elections Present Palestinian Issue With New Opportunities

Political shifts tied to upcoming US and Israeli elections are ushering in a new phase for the Palestinian issue, influenced by changing American public opinion toward Israel and the growing progressive wing within the Democratic Party. These developments could potentially end the era of Benjamin Netanyahu and the far-right religious bloc. The core question, however, is not just about the nature of change in Washington and Tel Aviv, but its impact on policies toward Palestinians and the Palestinian leadership's ability to leverage these transformations.

In Washington, a gradual shift in US policy toward the Palestinian issue is anticipated over the next two years, especially with Democratic control of Congress and the increasing influence of the progressive wing, spurred by the Gaza war, Israeli actions, and settler violence in the West Bank. While not a complete policy reversal, this will make unconditional support for Israel politically costlier and increase scrutiny of US administrative decisions. Former President Trump, meanwhile, will likely continue to support his Gaza peace plan, albeit with less urgency. Both major US parties agree on disarming Gaza, ending Hamas rule, and establishing new administrative arrangements. Critiques of Israel and solidarity with Palestinians do not equate to supporting Hamas. Democrats, however, will focus more on the mechanisms of the peace council, the interests of participating parties, and the risks of turning Gaza's reconstruction into a political-economic project rather than a means to rebuild Palestinian life and secure national rights. Future US policy will likely balance support for the peace plan with increased criticism of Israeli conduct, particularly regarding settlements and settler violence.

On the Israeli side, Gadi Eisenkot's potential appointment to form a government, separate from Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, and Smotrich, could mark a significant shift in internal affairs and relations with Palestinians. While the opposition's desire to end Netanyahu's tenure is a unifying factor, a change in government may not alter Israel's strategic stance on Palestinian rights but rather its methods of conflict management. In Gaza, a new Israeli government might align with the US on disarming the territory, ending Hamas rule, and implementing the peace plan. However, failure to implement the plan, with Hamas blamed, could reignite military escalation. Conversely, a new government might facilitate gradual Israeli withdrawals, introduce a stabilization force, and empower a new Palestinian committee and police force. In the West Bank, a new government is expected to be firmer against settler violence, more willing to dismantle illegal outposts, and less hostile toward the Palestinian Authority. This could include reconsidering the release of accumulated tax revenues and easing restrictions on Palestinian workers entering Israel. Nevertheless, a less extremist government does not necessarily signal readiness to end the occupation or recognize a Palestinian state.

Amid these external shifts, the Palestinian arena appears stagnant, divided, and lacking strategic vision. This places a historical responsibility on Palestinians to move beyond passive waiting and national obligations. Past efforts at national dialogue and reconciliation have not yielded sustainable practical results, suggesting some initiatives were more about managing pressure than a genuine will for political reform. Elections are not a panacea but are crucial for restoring legitimacy and renewing popular mandates, which stem from citizen choice, not closed-door agreements. The coming phase requires a national vision that transcends division, addresses the relationship between the PA and the PLO, rebuilds democratic institutions, and links Gaza's reconstruction to ending the political and geographical separation between Gaza and the West Bank. While changes in Washington and Tel Aviv may offer opportunities to ease pressure and rearrange political, security, and economic matters, they do not guarantee an end to the occupation or the establishment of a Palestinian state. The US will maintain its strategic calculations, and Israel will defend its interests. The real challenge lies in the Palestinians' ability to regain political initiative and national legitimacy; otherwise, external changes will remain deferred opportunities, with others continuing to decide the future of the Palestinian cause.