Supreme Court May Erase Its Own Power by Overturning Judicial Reform
Translated & summarized from Maariv by baba
Justice Yitzhak Amit and the Supreme Court are reportedly poised to invalidate the Levin-Sa'ar reform concerning the Judicial Selection Committee. This action, however, could paradoxically lead to the establishment of a constitutional court that would strip the Supreme Court of its powers. The ruling is expected soon, with the court seeking opportune political timing. The author argues that invalidating the reform will ultimately weaken the Supreme Court by transferring its authority to a new, politically appointed body.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- The Supreme Court may invalidate the Levin-Sa'ar reform, altering the Judicial Selection Committee.
- Justice Yitzhak Amit has indicated the court's strong stance against the reform's procedural flaws.
- The article argues this decision could lead to a constitutional court that diminishes the Supreme Court's power.
- The court is reportedly delaying its ruling for strategic political timing.
- The author believes this move will transfer judicial authority to a politically accountable body.
The Israeli Supreme Court, led by Justice Yitzhak Amit, is reportedly preparing to strike down the Levin-Sa'ar reform, which altered the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. However, the article argues this move could be the court's greatest mistake, potentially paving the way for a constitutional court that would strip the Supreme Court of its power.
Amit has signaled his intent to proceed forcefully, issuing an interim order against the broadcast reform shortly after the election results were known, citing procedural flaws. The article anticipates the Supreme Court will invalidate the changes to the Judicial Selection Committee, citing "politicization" of the judicial appointment process. Amit reportedly stated during a hearing that the idea of politicians choosing judges is unsettling and that legal professionals are better equipped to identify good judges than politicians.
The ruling is believed to be written and is being held for political timing, possibly until a new government is formed. The article suggests that striking down the Levin-Sa'ar amendment would inevitably lead to the establishment of a separate constitutional court. This new court would absorb the Supreme Court's powers, including the authority to disqualify laws, and its judges would be selected by politicians.
This outcome, the author contends, would be disastrous for judicial activism, as the Supreme Court could lose all the political power it has accumulated without explicit Knesset authorization. The piece posits that no Western democracy allows its judiciary to disqualify laws while a "professional majority" selects its judges, arguing that political power necessitates political accountability through elected officials.
The article concludes that the Supreme Court's potential decision to invalidate the reform, rather than preventing the judicial overhaul, might accelerate the creation of a constitutional court, thereby diminishing the Supreme Court's influence.