Thousands of Israelis Unwittingly Spread Foreign Election Propaganda
Translated & summarized from Cursorinfo by baba
Foreign intelligence services have created hundreds of fake social media accounts to spread election propaganda in Hebrew among Israelis, according to a study by Spain's Golden Owl institute. The network, with 445 accounts linked to Iran, uses realistic profiles to influence public opinion on key issues like the October 7th attacks and the current government. The operation aims to undermine election results by engaging thousands of real Israeli users to amplify its messages.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- Hundreds of fake social media accounts, linked to Iranian intelligence, were created to spread election propaganda in Hebrew.
- The network infiltrated Israel's information space using realistic profiles of students, reservists, and journalists.
- Evidence of centralized control includes mass account registration and identical post content.
- The propaganda targeted key issues such as the October 7th attacks, hostages, and military conscription.
- The primary strategic goal of the operation is to undermine the legitimacy of election results.
- The network engaged approximately 3,463 real Israeli users to repost its content.
Hundreds of fake social media accounts, posing as ordinary Israeli citizens, have been created by foreign intelligence services to spread election propaganda in Hebrew. A large-scale study by the Spanish OSINT institute Golden Owl revealed a sophisticated network of bots from hostile states targeting Israelis. The analysis of the X social network examined approximately 70,000 profiles discussing elections, identifying 694 suspicious accounts, with 445 strongly linked to Iranian intelligence.
These fake accounts, masquerading as students, reservists, and journalists, use Hebrew names, national symbols, and plausible biographies to infiltrate Israel's information space. Evidence of centralized control includes the mass registration of 243 accounts on June 17, 2025, during the Israeli-Iranian war, along with identical texts and the presence of Arabic or Persian keyboard layouts. Analysts also noted 451 instances of duplicated posts and even unedited phrases from generative chatbots left by mistake.
The network operates without a large native audience, inserting itself into discussions by commenting on posts by popular politicians and engaging about 3,463 real Israeli users to repost its content. Key propaganda narratives focus on the Prime Minister's personal responsibility for the October 7, 2023, events, the fate of hostages, the exemption of ultra-Orthodox individuals from military service, and alleged mass emigration from Israel.
Of 807 profiles analyzed, 450 promoted the idea that the war was being waged to maintain power, 407 urged votes against the current leadership, and 228 contrasted Iran's power with Israel's weakness. In addition to the Iranian connection, fake profiles with technical links to Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Turkey, and Nigeria were identified. Researchers stated the primary strategic goal of this operation is to undermine the legitimacy of election results. Previously, "Cursor" reported on Russian attempts to influence Knesset elections.
