Netanyahu's Talent for Deception Masks Israel's Deep Failures

The author argues that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, despite his acknowledged intelligence and personal resilience, has masterfully convinced his supporters that Israel is in excellent condition, even as the nation faces existential threats. This narrative, the author contends, prevents necessary reforms and masks fundamental failures, particularly in the wake of the October 7th attacks. Netanyahu's supporters claim his tenure has been successful and Israel's strategic position is strong, a view the author dismisses as "imaginary history and alternate reality."

The article criticizes the current right-wing government, led by Netanyahu, for policies characterized by harmful actions, populism, a culture of falsehoods, economic and national irresponsibility, denial of problems, and evasion of accountability. These issues, the author notes, are also present in a right-wing government, suggesting that the "Greater Israel" bloc's policies have also proven to be an existential danger. The author contrasts this with the potential dangers of a left-wing government, which would likely require the support of Arab or ultra-Orthodox parties and figures like Avigdor Lieberman, making it unstable.

The author draws a parallel between the flawed military concept of the Bar-Lev Line during the Yom Kippur War and Netanyahu's "Netanyahu Line" or "sarcophagus" approach, which allegedly concealed not only Gaza but also a severe weakening of the ground forces and a decline in the security establishment. This flawed security doctrine, characterized by absurd decision-making processes, inadequate force buildup, lack of decisive plans, and questionable appointments, has persisted under Netanyahu's leadership for decades. The author criticizes Netanyahu's response to these failures as "irresponsibility."

While acknowledging Netanyahu's refusal to "surrender" until a strategic error in Qatar, the author faults him for failing to achieve decisive victory and for presiding over the IDF's transformation into a non-decisive army. The primary responsibility, the author asserts, lies in ensuring these systems function with appropriate concepts and plans. Crucially, Netanyahu has not learned from October 7th, clinging to the same foundational assumptions, as evidenced by the Winograd Commission and his recent security concept.

The author concludes that the problem is not solely Netanyahu but the voters themselves, who must create a political incentive system that holds elected officials accountable. The author expresses support for Ofer Winter, believing he is the only candidate with the right approach for fundamental, conceptual, and systemic change, and hopes he will be appointed Defense Minister to enact reforms. The author argues that this election is the most fateful in Israel's history, emphasizing the need for functional state systems and long-term preparation over immediate crisis management.