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Ongoing Story· Day 16

Israel Detects Hamas Preparations for Potential Attack

3 developments

VestySecurity

Hamas Threatens Attacks Beyond Gaza, Israel Assesses Capabilities

Translated & summarized from Vesty by baba

CommunityNeutral tone

Russian · Sole source

Israeli sources report Hamas is preparing for renewed conflict and may launch preemptive attacks beyond Gaza, including within Israel and abroad. While Hamas's capabilities are assessed as diminished since October 7, they are still considered capable of significant attacks. Israel notes changes in Hamas's behavior, including increased visibility of militants and a shift to direct threats. The group is believed to be buying time before potential Israeli operations, while Israel faces the challenge of preventing Hamas from diverting humanitarian aid and resources for its own military buildup.

The story in 6 lines · by baba

  • Hamas is preparing for renewed conflict and may initiate attacks beyond Gaza, according to Israeli sources.
  • Hamas has threatened to replicate October 7 attacks in Israel, Judea and Samaria, and abroad.
  • Israeli assessments indicate Hamas's capabilities are diminished but still pose a threat.
  • Changes in Hamas's behavior include increased militant visibility and direct threats.
  • Israel estimates Hamas is using the upcoming elections to limit Israeli operational freedom.
  • Israel faces challenges in preventing Hamas from diverting humanitarian aid for its operations.

High-ranking Israeli sources, as reported by Ynet on October 22, assess that Hamas is preparing for renewed hostilities and might initiate attacks against Israel. This assessment follows an unprecedented threat from Gaza's Hamas leadership, conveyed to Israel via a UN coordinator. Hamas reportedly stated it could replicate the October 7 attacks wherever possible, including within Israel, Judea and Samaria, and abroad. Israeli journalists Itamar Eichner and Elisha Ben-Kimon explored Hamas's capabilities in a Ynet article the same day. While acknowledging Hamas's capacity to attack, Israeli sources believe such actions might not match the scale of the October 7 massacre, potentially involving attacks on military posts, soldier abductions, and incursions into Israeli communities. Military and political cabinet reviews indicate Hamas has intensified preparations for war, accumulating weapons and moving them into civilian areas. Israel estimates Hamas is banking on Israeli and US elections in late October and early November to limit Israel's operational freedom. Hamas is seen as buying time to produce more weapons and recruit fighters, aware this window of opportunity is closing. The group apparently believes a deal for Gaza is unlikely and may strike first if it perceives Israel is about to launch a major operation.

Significant changes in Hamas's behavior are noted by Israel. These include a more visible presence of uniformed militants, the relocation of weapons from tunnels to schools and hospitals, and a shift from conciliatory statements to direct threats. Hamas has also reportedly begun distributing weapons to civilians, which Israel interprets as preparation for potential disarmament demands. Israeli sources suggest Hamas is ending its previous strategy of appearing willing to disarm and cooperate, a tactic that had previously positioned Israel as the party delaying a Gaza plan. The IDF and Shin Bet believe Hamas has no intention of voluntarily disarming, a conclusion presented to the Israeli government. The military anticipates that disarming Hamas will eventually require a deeper incursion into Gaza, a task deemed unachievable by international forces. Israel also anticipates Hamas might feign disarmament by surrendering faulty or known weapons while concealing significant arsenals and fighters. The military wing is estimated to have around 30,000 fighters, with an additional 50,000 in civilian administration roles. Hamas continues to recruit, fueled by ideological indoctrination and competitive salaries, and retains elite "Nukhba" unit members, though some ministers note current fighters are less trained and equipped than before.

Regarding Hamas's capabilities, command and control have been severely impacted, with frequent leadership changes leading to less experienced personnel. While hundreds of rockets remain in Gaza, rebuilding this arsenal is difficult, and the capacity for significant rocket attacks is considered limited. However, not all launch sites are known to the IDF. Areas not subjected to Israeli ground operations, such as Al-Mawasi and central camps, may still harbor weapon caches and tunnels. Strikes in these densely populated civilian areas are complicated by the risk of significant collateral damage. Hamas is believed to have restored a substantial portion of its tunnel network in uncontrolled areas. In Judea and Samaria, Hamas has some capabilities, but the Shin Bet and IDF actively counter them, with security coordination with the Palestinian Authority also limiting Hamas's influence. Abroad, threats are linked to Hamas's reduced operational capacity within Gaza, especially after the absence of Israeli hostages, leading to talk of abducting soldiers. Hamas's financial situation has improved through external transfers and control of humanitarian aid, with Iran and Turkey cited as primary funders, utilizing digital currencies for transactions. Despite the war's impact, Hamas remains the dominant force in Gaza, with no significant local alternative power emerging. Reconstruction in Gaza has stalled due to a lack of funds, and international stabilization efforts are not functioning. Israel's Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) is preparing to gradually resume the import of goods, following reports that Hamas has canceled its levies on trucks. However, Israel remains concerned Hamas will exploit the import mechanism for its own benefit. While Palestinian merchants claim Hamas has dropped demands for payments per truck and a percentage of goods, COGAT is proceeding cautiously, prioritizing essential winter supplies and enforcing strict banking transaction controls to prevent Hamas from using imports to bolster its economic and military power. The core challenge for Israel remains ensuring that goods and resources reach the intended recipients and are not diverted by Hamas for its operations. Hamas reportedly spends approximately 90 million shekels monthly on salaries for its estimated 30,000 fighters and officials.

VestyOther · Tel Aviv

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