Rabbinical Court Orders Divorce Over Husband's Inability to Fulfill Marital Duties
Translated & summarized from Kipa by baba
A rabbinical court ordered a husband imprisoned for rape and other crimes to grant his wife a divorce, not because of the rape, but due to his inability to fulfill marital obligations. The court cited his imprisonment preventing financial support and conjugal relations as the grounds for the "get." The ruling has been criticized for not considering the rape of the wife's daughter as a direct cause for divorce, highlighting the difficult position of women seeking release from abusive marriages.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- A rabbinical court ordered a husband imprisoned for rape to grant his wife a divorce.
- The divorce was granted because the husband's imprisonment prevented him from fulfilling marital duties.
- The rape of the wife's minor daughter was not considered a direct cause for divorce by the court.
- The court cited the husband's inability to provide financial support and conjugal relations as grounds for the "get."
- The ruling highlights the challenges women face in obtaining divorces from abusive husbands.
- The article criticizes the court's reliance on indirect legal arguments rather than the severity of the husband's crimes.
A rabbinical court in 2025 ordered a husband to grant his wife a divorce, known as a "get," after he was sentenced to eleven years in prison for criminal offenses, including the rape of his wife's minor daughter from a previous marriage. While the ruling ostensibly acknowledges the severity of the husband's actions, the court's reasoning for compelling the divorce was not the rape itself, but rather the husband's inability to fulfill his basic marital obligations of financial support and conjugal relations due to his imprisonment.
The judges, Uriel Lavie, David Malka, and Chaim Vidal, creatively argued that since the husband's criminal actions led to his imprisonment, he is preventing himself from fulfilling his duties. They addressed the issue of financial support by noting that while the state provides some benefits, this does not negate the husband's obligation, and the wife is essentially receiving charity, not support from her husband. Regarding conjugal relations, the court dismissed the possibility of conjugal visits in prison, citing privacy concerns and the potential for humiliation.
The article, written by Rivka Lubitz, a research fellow at the Hartman Institute, criticizes the court's decision, arguing that the rape of the wife's daughter was not considered a valid reason for divorce by the rabbinical court. According to Lubitz, offenses against a third party are not seen as a direct harm to the wife, and therefore do not constitute grounds for a "get" in traditional rabbinic law. She contends that the court had to resort to convoluted legal arguments to justify the divorce, as the husband's horrific crimes against his stepdaughter were not deemed sufficient cause.
Lubitz highlights the difficult situation of women in marriage, emphasizing that even in severe cases like this, where a divorce seems obvious, a woman's freedom is often dependent on the husband's willingness to grant a "get." She points out that even if a husband is compelled to divorce and faces imprisonment for refusal, he can still prevent his wife from remarrying or having children. The author suggests that the wife in this case primarily seeks release from her abusive husband, not intimacy or financial support.