Netanyahu's Office Documents Contradict His Post-Oct. 7 Narrative

A document prepared by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's staff shortly after the October 7th attacks contradicts the Prime Minister's version of his role, according to journalists Ronen Bergman and Yuval Rubovich. The document, submitted in response to the State Comptroller's inquiry, reportedly states that political leadership instructed to "postpone clashes with Hamas and preserve its rule in Gaza." This information gains significance following a lawsuit filed against Netanyahu by former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar. The lawsuit, filed in the Central District Court, is seen by the authors as the closest substitute for an independent investigation in the absence of a state commission.

Bar's lawsuit details Netanyahu's reactions to Shin Bet proposals from July 2023. The Shin Bet warned of Hamas strengthening its power, increasing its capabilities, and inciting terror, along with a trend of consolidating fronts and escalating threats of simultaneous multi-front confrontations. The service recommended "restoring deterrence through Israeli-initiated rounds of conflict and expanding counter-terrorism operations." Netanyahu responded by writing on the document, "In a democracy, the Shin Bet is not responsible for formulating the State of Israel's national strategy," and added to the recommendations section, "This is not a directive from the head of the Shin Bet." Journalists interpret these notes as Netanyahu asserting his sole authority as Prime Minister to set the course.

The Prime Minister's office did not comment on these annotations. The article suggests Netanyahu's reluctance to commit such directives to writing may have been to avoid future accountability. The document prepared by Netanyahu's staff for the State Comptroller, spanning 92 pages with key findings on 1.5 pages, explicitly assigns blame for "postponing clashes," "preserving Hamas as effective rule," and "not wanting the defeat of the enemy." It states that political leadership's instructions "included, among other things: postponing clashes; relying on the barrier; periodic strikes; preserving Hamas as an effective authority that restrains itself and others." The document further acknowledges that this strategic approach "penetrated the IDF's operational concept regarding the abandonment of defeating Hamas and encouraged the search for 'substitutes for defeat.'"

Bergman and Rubovich argue that these findings directly contradict Netanyahu's claims, holding him responsible for neglecting Israel's security concept and abandoning the principle of defeating the enemy, which they link to the October 7th catastrophe. The document, created by his own staff, was a response to the State Comptroller's draft report. The article highlights specific directives, including Netanyahu's April 2019 order to "keep Gaza as a secondary front, avoid escalation if possible, and postpone clashes," and his May 2020 goal of "preserving Hamas as a force that restrains itself and others." A July 2, 2023, National Security Council presentation also listed "Efforts to maintain quiet for a long time (secondary front)" as the primary political directive for Gaza.

The report also details the failure to discuss the IDF's multi-year "Tnufa" plan, which involved reducing ground forces. Despite warnings from the National Security Council about discrepancies between the political directive and the plan's principles, and the need for budget framework discussions, Netanyahu never brought these issues to a vote in the security cabinet. The plan proceeded with reduced ground forces, a decision his staff later described as a "dangerous bet for which the state paid a high price." The journalists conclude that Netanyahu, as the "captain," steered the ship directly towards the October 7th "reef," refuting his narrative of being undermined by defiant generals.