Yair Golan's Views on Iran's Leadership Criticized as Dangerous Delusion
Translated & summarized from Israel Hayom by baba
Former deputy chief of staff Yair Golan's recent remarks suggesting the assassination of Iran's Ali Khamenei was a mistake have been heavily criticized. The author argues Golan misunderstands the nature of jihadist ideology, viewing it as a political negotiation rather than an absolute divine command. The article posits that this perspective is dangerous, especially after the October 7th attacks, and that Israel must believe its enemies' stated intentions and measure their capabilities. Golan's views are described as a dangerous illusion that threatens national security.
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Yair Golan's recent statements on Ali Khamenei's assassination are criticized as a dangerous misunderstanding of jihadist ideology.
- The author argues Khamenei was the architect of Iran's extremist policies, not a moderating force.
- Jihadist movements are characterized as having no moderates, only varying levels of patience towards their ultimate goals.
- The article asserts that democratic states must believe their enemies' stated intentions and measure their capabilities.
- Golan's perspective is called a dangerous illusion that threatens Israel's national security, especially post-October 7th.
Former deputy chief of staff Yair Golan's recent statements regarding the assassination of Ali Khamenei and the nature of the Iranian regime have drawn sharp criticism. Golan suggested that Khamenei's elimination was a "mistake" that empowered the Revolutionary Guards and brought more extremist leaders to power, adding that an aging leader offers certain advantages. This contradicts his earlier praise for the security forces after the assassination. The author argues that Khamenei was not a moderating force but the architect of Iran's revolutionary ideology, including its missile and nuclear programs, and its support for proxy groups. Khamenei's own statements, including a 2015 declaration that Israel would not exist in 25 years, are presented as a clear work plan, not mere rhetoric.
The article contends that Golan's conceptual error lies in viewing the Iranian regime as a risk management office with varying degrees of extremism, rather than as a unified ideological movement. It asserts that within jihadist movements, there are no moderates, only those who are patient and those who are impatient, with the ultimate goal remaining the same. The author dismisses the idea of a "moderate jihadist" as a dangerous illusion, stemming from a fundamental misunderstanding of Islamic fundamentalism, where concepts like jihad and shahada are absolute divine commands, not subjects for negotiation.
The piece further criticizes Golan's notion that assassinations without a political strategy are mere "grass cutting." It argues that in the world of radical Islamic fundamentalism, tactics like temporary ceasefires or deception are employed only out of weakness, but the ultimate objective remains unchanged. The author draws parallels to historical Islamic treaties and sayings, emphasizing that the core ideology driving groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime predates any specific leader or assassination.
The article concludes that Golan's perspective, which seeks a "political leg" with jihadist leadership, is a dangerous illusion that threatens national security. It stresses that democratic states fighting fundamentalist entities must believe their enemy's stated intentions and constantly measure their capabilities. The author argues that eliminating terrorist leaders is not just tactical grass cutting but a strategic imperative that dismantles centers of authority and shatters the aura of immunity, especially in a region where honor and power are intertwined. The piece suggests that Golan, despite his experience, has learned nothing from the October 7th attacks and continues to seek moderates where none exist.