Netanyahu Government Accused of Delaying Haredi Draft Law for Years
Translated & summarized from Zman Yisrael by baba
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government has been criticized for a prolonged pattern of delaying legislation to conscript ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men into the IDF. Despite a High Court order in June 2024 demanding a new law, the government has allegedly weakened enforcement, reduced targets, and offered concessions, prioritizing coalition stability over effective recruitment. This approach has persisted for over two decades, with legislative efforts repeatedly failing to create binding enlistment mechanisms or meaningful sanctions for non-compliance, even as the IDF faces critical manpower shortages.
The story in 6 lines · by baba
- The Netanyahu government is accused of consistently delaying an effective conscription law for Haredi men for over two decades.
- A June 2024 High Court ruling mandated new legislation, but the government allegedly opted for further delays and concessions.
- The article details a history of failed conscription laws, including the "Tal Law" and subsequent amendments, often weakened by political considerations.
- Key figures like Yuli Edelstein and Yoav Gallant were replaced, allegedly to facilitate a less stringent draft law.
- Proposed plans, like the "Bismuth plan," are criticized for having low effective targets and loopholes that avoid sanctions.
- The government has continued funding Haredi institutions and delaying sanctions, despite the IDF's urgent need for personnel.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government has been accused of deliberately delaying the passage of an effective conscription law for the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) population, instead opting for a series of postponements, concessions, and temporary arrangements. Since the October 7th attacks, which heightened the need for manpower in the IDF and increased the burden on existing soldiers, the government has weakened enforcement mechanisms, lowered recruitment targets, reduced sanctions on draft dodgers, and even frozen enforcement proceedings against those obligated to enlist. This pattern of behavior, according to the report, has persisted for over two decades, with practical decisions consistently postponed.
Despite a High Court ruling in June 2024 stating that the current model is unsustainable without new legislation, the government has not used the opportunity to create a binding enlistment mechanism. Instead, it has continued to seek ways to soften the consequences of non-enlistment. The article argues that Netanyahu's actions, rather than his statements, indicate a preference for maintaining coalitions with Haredi parties and deferring the issue, rather than a determined effort to increase Haredi enlistment.
The history of Haredi conscription legislation, dating back to the "Torato Omanuto" (His Torah is His Craft) arrangement and the subsequent "Tal Law" in 2002, is detailed. The Tal Law, which regulated deferments for yeshiva students, was eventually struck down by the High Court in 2012 for failing to adequately address the inequality in the burden of service. Subsequent legislative attempts in 2014 and 2015, under Netanyahu's leadership and with varying coalition compositions, also failed to create an effective conscription law, with one amendment in 2015 weakening enforcement mechanisms.
The High Court's June 2024 ruling marked a significant turning point, stating that the state must act to draft yeshiva students in the absence of a law, and that the government cannot selectively exempt entire populations. The court also noted the dire security situation, emphasizing the IDF's urgent need for additional personnel. However, the legislative process that followed saw further changes, including the replacement of Yuli Edelstein, who advocated for a law with "teeth," with Boaz Bismuth, who was seen as more amenable to Haredi demands. The article also points to the dismissal of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who had supported increased Haredi enlistment, and the appointment of Israel Katz, as potentially clearing obstacles for a less stringent law.
Further analysis of the proposed "Bismuth plan" reveals that its recruitment targets were significantly lower than they appeared due to built-in "safety nets" allowing for shortfalls without sanctions, and the inclusion of alternative civilian-national service. The effective target for the first year was reduced to 3,600, and potentially even lower when accounting for non-military service. The definition of "Haredi" was also broad, potentially including individuals who had left the Haredi lifestyle. The government's actions in 2026, including temporarily freezing the Bismuth plan and promoting legislation to freeze arrests of yeshiva students, further illustrate the pattern of delay and avoidance of effective enforcement, despite the IDF's stated needs.
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