Iran's Nuclear Program Accelerated After US Withdrawal From Deal

Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities has seen significant acceleration, particularly after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, a move strongly encouraged by then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Initially, Iran had agreed to halt uranium enrichment for 15 years under the 2015 deal, limiting its enriched uranium stock to 300 kg of 3.67% purity and dismantling two-thirds of its centrifuges. This compliance was verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with even Israeli intelligence concluding Iran was adhering to the agreement.

However, following the US withdrawal and reimposition of sanctions, Iran announced it was no longer bound by the deal. By 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to higher levels, including 60% purity, a critical step towards weapons-grade material. As of August 2024, Iran possessed approximately 165 kg of 60% enriched uranium, enough for several nuclear bombs, effectively making it a nuclear threshold state. The article notes that the agreement, intended to halt enrichment for 15 years, was effectively undone in less than four years.

The situation escalated further following the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. This event, coupled with a prior "beeper attack," altered Iran's strategic calculus, leading to a perceived need for a new deterrent. Iran's uranium enrichment has since surged, with a significant increase in 5% enriched uranium from 2.59 tons to 6.02 tons between October 2024 and June 2025. Simultaneously, its stock of 60% enriched uranium more than doubled, from 182.3 kg to 440.9 kg in the same period, enough for about 11 bombs.

In June 2025, IAEA inspections ceased following a combined US-Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, with Netanyahu again playing a key role in the decision to strike. The extent of damage and remaining enrichment capabilities are unknown, with speculation about whether the enriched uranium was moved, destroyed, or hidden. A subsequent, larger attack in February 2026 aimed at regime change killed top officials but did not collapse the government, potentially strengthening Iran's resolve to acquire nuclear weapons.

The author argues that the forceful approach, exemplified by the JCPOA's cancellation and subsequent strikes, has paradoxically driven Iran towards faster enrichment and higher purity levels. This contrasts with the diplomatic approach of the JCPOA, which effectively halted the nuclear project and depleted Iran's enriched uranium stockpile. The current situation is deemed far more dangerous than in 2018, with potential Iranian nuclear capability posing a dramatic threat to regional and global power balances.